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Abstract: With democracy declining and becoming sporadically illib-
eral and populist in Europe and elsewhere, the questions of demo-
cratic transformation gain new resonance and topicality. Within the 
European Union and its neighbourhoods, the results of long-pursued 
Europeanisation are being reconsidered against the new criteria of 
democratic transition resilience, as well as against the new realities of 
emerging de-democratisation and de-Europeanisation undercurrents 
− and the re-emerging split of Europe. The thirtieth anniversary of the 
Central and Eastern European countries’ democratic transition and 
‘return to EUrope’ provides a good opportunity to reassess success-
es and shortcomings of their transformation trajectories. Rather than 
engaging in a metrical exercise of measuring the quality of democ-
racy in each EU member state, this article approaches the puzzle of 
East-Central European states’ transition resilience from an interdisci-
plinary law and politics perspective on the respective countries’ tran-
sition to EU ‘member-statehood’ and ‘neighbour-statehood’ as distinct 
types of statehood. In so doing, it develops an account of European 
Union ‘member state-building’ and ‘neighbour state-building’ as an in-
herent part of the respective countries’ simultaneous transformation, 
European integration, and state-building agendas. Drawing on the de-
mocratisation, Europeanisation and state-building literatures, as well 
as a wealth of primary sources, this article bridges the discussion of 
the differentiated EU-induced and EU-centric transition trajectories of 
candidate and non-candidate countries in light of them becoming suc-
cessfully, or less so, ‘ideal’ EU members or neighbours, respectively.
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1 Introduction
European history advances in practically tri-decadal cycles. The 
close of 2019/2020 has arguably ended the cycle in European history 
and politics that commenced in 1989, thus ma(r)king a new opening for 
change or continuity. The 1989 Revolution brought sweeping changes 
throughout the whole of Central and Eastern Europe as Communist rule 
and socialism crumbled across the region, and states embarked on their 
paths of ‘return to Europe’, reforming their political, administrative and 
socio-economic orders, as well as − in the case of some countries − their 
own fundamental constitutional orders. As observes Magocsi in his His-
torical Atlas of Central Europe, the ‘greatest transformation took place 
in those states that had a federal structure during the Communist era 
− Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia’ as, within the next 
two decades, ‘four countries [ie the former three plus the East-German 
Democratic Republic] ceased to exist and eventually thirteen new coun-
tries came into being’.1 Among them, one can fi nd ten post-socialist Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries (CEECs) that, some fi fteen years 
later, became ‘new’ EU member states (Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Po-
land, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia plus three post-Soviet Baltic republics 
− Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), and inter alia three post-Soviet newly 
independent states that, thirty years past, still struggle for their full 
independence from Russia’s postcolonial embrace and the much-wanted 
‘return’ to Europe (namely, two ‘Western NISs’ − Moldova and Ukraine 
save Belarus, and a South Caucasian republic − Georgia). Colloquially, 
the two groups are usually referred to as ‘new Europe’ and ‘new Eastern 
Europe’ − which tethers the respective discursive markers of their iden-
tarian belonging and development trajectories set or sought.
These three decades of democratic transition in the CEECs can 
roughly be divided into two main stages: the period of systematic trans-
formation of the CEECs’ economies and their preparation for EU mem-
bership (1989−2004) and the period of systemic convergence, ie the adap-
tation of the CEECs’ national economies to the Single Market of the Eu-
ropean Union, as well as the EU acquis, policies and key socio-economic 
and governance indicators of the ‘old’ member states (2004−2019). One 
can argue that, formally, the socio-economic transformation began in 
East-Central Europe in the annus mirabilis of 1989 and ended by 2004, 
when they joined the European Union. A more realistic account would 
suggest, however, that transformation is a process rather than a desti-
nation: as much as European integration itself is a moving target and 
the EU is changing as well, the process of transformation appears not to 
1 Paul Robert Magocsi, Historical Atlas of Central Europe (3rd edn, University of Toronto 
Press 2018) 221.
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have an expiration date. This is also true for the EU’s post-2004 Eastern 
neighbours − the ‘New Eastern Europe’ states, which, after regaining 
their independence in the early 1990s, have been longing for closer inte-
gration with the Euro-Atlantic structures while transforming their polit-
ical and economic systems and defending their sovereignties at the same 
time from the postcolonial claims of their own big eastward neighbour.
This article will, therefore, bridge the legal and political discussion 
of democratic transition in wider Europe, including the 2004/07 CEE 
entrants and the EU’s new Eastern neighbours.2 Structuring the dis-
cussion around the identifi ed milestone developments in the given coun-
tries’ status change within the united and institutionalised Europe (ie 
EU-Europe or EUrope), this article will cast an EU-centric foreign policy 
perspective, with an eye on the Union’s enlargement and neighbourhood 
policies as drivers of nation-state transformation and (re)constitution as 
an EU member or neighbour state, respectively. Thereby, it will advance 
an encompassing analytical perspective − ie EU member and neighbour 
state-building − that cuts across juxtaposing propositions from European 
integration theories (issues in legal, economic and political integration; 
integration of core state powers; multi-level governance; enlargement; 
Europeanisation), state-building and state transformation, modernisation, 
and development literatures, as well as transition and democratisation 
studies.
Methodologically, this study of law and politics of EU member and 
neighbour state-building is primarily guided by the interdisciplinary re-
search logic and methods that help unearth the relationship between 
European integration and state-building processes, bring to the surface 
tacit understandings of some of its facets (state transformation and mod-
ernisation as a ‘collateral benefi t’ of EU member state-building), as well 
as helping to expose relevant misunderstandings or gaps in the fi eld con-
cerned (alleged linearity and determinism of democratisation, EU acces-
sion and Europeanisation processes; reverse spill-overs of de-democra-
tisation and de-Europeanisation). In particular, the study incorporates, 
as part of its interdisciplinary methodological toolkit, the techniques of 
deriving (extending and modifying conventional research programmes, 
thus producing new objects of analysis), digging (engaging with social-
ly and materially constructed reality combined with unearthing tacit 
relationships and articulating new meaning of under-the-surface mat-
2 In what follows, the article will collectively refer to the EU’s 2004/07 ‘new member states’ 
as ‘Central and East European countries’ (CEECs), as established in the literature and 
much of the political discourse. Instead, the term ‘East-Central Europe’ (ECE) is used to 
denote a geographically and politically broader region that includes both the EU’s ‘new 
member states’ (‘new Europe’) and the neighbouring post-Soviet countries of the so-called 
‘new Eastern Europe’ (NEE).
136 Andriy Tyushka: Twists and Turns of Democratic Transition and Europeanisation...
ters that are usually taken for granted), abducting (ampliative and gen-
erative inference and fostering of creative interdisciplinary interactions), 
exemplifying, explaining and generalising (using the capacity of single 
instance, or the situated example, to produce other forms of knowledge, 
by making intelligible complex contexts and hinting beyond the concrete 
at something larger and more general).3 
In addition, the study also draws on applicable disciplinary − legal 
and political − research methods, such as doctrinal analysis, content and 
discourse analysis. The European institutional discourses and the Eu-
ropean Union’s practices of building the member- and neighbour-states 
will be examined in order to uncover the gravity of the European inte-
gration perspective (and process) for democratic transition and resilient 
domestic transformation in East-Central European states. Symptomat-
ically, the EU institutional discourse on the CEECs’ transition and per-
formance in a family of European liberal democracies has been shaped 
by Commission communications and reports, the European Parliament’s 
debates and enquiries, the European Council’s conclusions and state-
ments, as well as, more recently − the case law of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union. In addition, this take will incorporate analysis 
of within-EU popular discourses, as represented inter alia in a series of 
standard and special public opinion polls (ie ‘Eurobarometers’), aiming 
to pinpoint varied popular expectations, perceptions and support (le-
gitimation) with regard to the EU’s enlargement process, the acceding 
countries themselves, and the ensuing statehood-transformative prac-
tices of EU member state-building through Europeanisation both within 
and beyond the enlargement paradigm. As the EU member state-build-
ing process is a two-way street, with every next enlargement iteration, as 
well as treaty reforms, re-defi ning the parameters of EU member-state-
hood in constitutional, administrative, judicial and not least identitarian 
terms, popular evaluation and legitimation of the process by the EU’s 
two-tier ‘peoplehood’4 is of key importance. In an endeavour to uncover 
deeper dimensions of EU member-statehood as a unique legal-political 
and identitarian category, rather than pondering on the mere facts and 
processes of the acquisition of EU membership status, this article will 
regard the EU accession-induced democratisation, transformation and 
Europeanisation in East-Central European states as ‘collateral benefi ts’ 
and as an essential part of the Union’s member state-building policy. It 
will also present an argument about the spill-over effects of this policy 
onto the EU’s emerging neighbourhoods that, for the moment, are not 
3 Celia Lury and others (eds), Routledge Handbook of Interdisciplinary Research Methods 
(Routledge 2018) 90-94, 164-168, 284-286, 296-310.
4 Jan Pieter Beetz, ‘A Two-Tier Conception of European Union Peoplehood: A Realist Study 
of European Citizens’ Bonds of Collectivity’ (2017) 23(6) European Law Journal 467.
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part of the Union’s member state-building agenda but do follow similar 
templates of EU-style regime change, democratisation and multi-layered 
Europeanisation. As will be argued, such policy templates and processes 
have so far resulted in the production of a special category of state and 
statehood that transcend the boundaries of national sovereignty − ie an 
EU ‘neighbour state’. 
Much of the literature in the fi eld has richly covered the causal and 
procedural aspects of EU-induced transformation through enlargement 
and Europeanisation as such, with the teleological and effect-related 
aspects of these phenomena enjoying considerably lesser attention. 
In what follows, this article will employ the EU member/neighbour 
state-building perspective in order to address both the causality, (non-)
linearity, multi-layeredness, collaterality and consequentialism of the 
state-transformative processes in East-Central Europe since 1989. Di-
mensionally, the study into causality will involve the examination of 
external incentives, European integration dynamics, multi-level gover-
nance politics and the EU legal order development, with repercussions 
for the adjustment, or re-constitution, of domestic constitutional orders 
of EU member and neighbour states. The (non-)linearity aspect will be 
traced across the overlapping processes of (a) revolution-making and 
counter-revolution, (b) democratisation and de-democratisation, (c) Eu-
ropeanisation, de-Europeanisation, re-nationalisation, and re-Europe-
anisation trends, (d) EU accession versus withdrawal processes, as well 
as the interim versus ‘eternalised’ status acquisition on the spectrum 
‘between membership and non-membership’ in the EU. The multi-lay-
ered dimensionality will be examined all along the relevant develop-
ments in geographical, legal, political, socio-economic and cultural 
terms. Last but not least, the enquiry into the collaterality, or ‘collateral 
benefi ts’, of the simultaneously unfolding processes and phenomena 
along the democratisation−Europeanisation−state-building nexus will 
be intrinsically instrumental in unveiling the consequentialist rationale 
and thus providing teleological explanations of the EU member and 
neighbour state-building paradigm.
In what follows, the article will fi rst situate the herewith advanced 
analytical perspective within the nexus of EU-induced and EU-centric 
state transformation and state-building in general, and will outline the 
EU member/neighbour state-building approach in particular. Structur-
ing the empirical discussion around the milestone developments in adja-
cent geographical realms of ‘wider’ Europe, the article will then discuss 
the causalities, (non-)linearities, multi-layeredness, and collaterality 
of EU member and neighbour state-building practices before and after 
2004 − a juncture for both the EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood 
policies in East-Central Europe.
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2 Democratic transition and Europeanisation of East-Central 
Europe: a European Union member and neighbour state-building 
perspective
The European Union has a remarkable gift and track record of 
transforming the trajectories of nations − whether as part of the process 
of their EU accession or broader Europeanisation beyond the borders.
Whether the idea of ‘normative power Europe’,5 ‘transformative 
power Europe’6 or other ‘adjectivised’ representations of EUropean in-
ternational identity and actorness − all consider, in one way or an-
other, the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law 
to be a quintessential characteristic of EU foreign policy, which has 
led some authors to argue that, in every case, we face an inherently 
‘democratising power Europe’.7 The literature abounds in accounts of 
the EU’s efforts and failures in democracy promotion across its neigh-
bourhoods.8
Notably, in the European inside-out context, the idea of democra-
tisation (ie democratic consolidation or transition) is densely embed-
ded in discussions of the appeal and transformative power of EUrope. 
Broadly captured in the ‘Europeanisation’ scholarship, the European 
Union’s transformative-power performance has been observed with ev-
ery completed and open enlargement post-1995,9 as well as in the context 
5 Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ (2002) 40(2) Journal 
of Common Market Studies 235.
6 Heather Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power. Europeanization through Conditionality 
in Central and Eastern Europe (Palgrave Macmillan 2006); Tanja A Börzel and Thomas 
Risse, ‘The Transformative Power of Europe: The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas’ 
(2009) 1 KFG Working Papers <http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/kfgwp/wpseries/Work-
ingPaperKFG_1.pdf> accessed 20 July 2020.
7 Irene Hahn, ‘Democratising Power Europe? Modes of EU Democracy Promotion in Post-So-
cialist Europe’ in Edmund Ratka and Olga A. Spaiser (eds), Understanding European Neigh-
bourhood Policies: Concepts, Actors, Perceptions (Nomos 2012) 287.
8 See one of the early-on and comprehensive enquiries: Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schim-
melfennig (eds), Democracy Promotion in the EU’s Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Gover-
nance? (Routledge 2013).
9 Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso, and Thomas Risse (eds), Transforming Europe. 
Europeanization and Domestic Change (Cornell University Press 2001); Leonardo Morlino 
and Wojciech Sadurski (eds), Democratization and the European Union. Comparing Central 
and East European Post-Communist Countries (Routledge 2010); Soeren Keil, ‘Europeaniza-
tion, State-building and Democratization in the Western Balkans’ (2013) 41(3) Nationalities 
Papers 343; Arolda Elbasani (ed), European Integration and Transformation in the Western 
Balkans: Europeanization or Business as Usual? (Routledge 2013).
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of structuring its relations with immediate10 and further11 neighbour-
hoods.12 
Europeanisation13 is generally regarded as the European Union’s 
impact (and the process of impacting) on domestic institutions, discours-
es, political processes and policies of both the member states, candidate 
countries, and the adjacent neighbourhood countries (so-called ‘Europe-
anisation beyond borders’). Following one of the signature authors advo-
cating for this approach, Europeanisation is defi ned as:
Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways 
of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are fi rst defi ned 
and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated 
in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and 
public policies.14 
The rationality of this externally incentivised domestic transfor-
mation process is engrained in the so-called ‘external incentives model’ 
(EIM) − a ‘rationalist bargaining model’ which underpins EU conditional-
ity.15 The latter is tailored in a differentiated manner to acceding coun-
tries and other types of the EU’s structured relations with third coun-
tries. The implementation of the conditionality approach is anything but 
10 Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘Europeanization beyond Europe’ (2012) 7(1) Living Reviews in 
European Governance 1.
11 See eg Georgiy Voloshin, The European Union’s Normative Power in Central Asia: Promot-
ing Values and Defending Interests (Palgrave Macmillan 2014).
12 For an overarching discussion of the reach and scope of Europeanisation ‘beyond EU 
member states’ (ie including quasi-member states, candidate countries, neighbourhood 
countries, other OECD countries, as well as those in further-away regions of Latin America, 
Asia and Africa), see Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘EU External Governance and Europeanization 
Beyond the EU’ in David Levi-Faur (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Governance (OUP 2012).
13 In this article, the phenomenon and processes of ‘Europeanisation’ feature as an object of 
analysis − and not as an analytical lens itself. The article goes beyond asking what the im-
pact of EU membership on member states is, thus pondering on the fundamental questions 
‘to what end are states being Europeanised?’ and ‘how well reconcilable is it with their na-
tion-state building agendas?’. Thereby, it casts a ‘long view’ on Europeanisation, seeing it as 
a process that certainly does not end with EU accession and has no point of saturation or a 
fi xed fi nalité − wherefore it is bound to entail, one way or another, a confl ict of sovereignties.
14 Claudio M Radaelli, ‘The Europeanization of Public Policy’ in Kevin Featherstone and 
Claudio M Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanization (OUP 2003) 30.
15 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule 
Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe’ (2004) 11(4) Journal 
of European Public Policy 663. The authors posit that the ‘external incentives model’ (EIM) 
envisages that ‘EU external governance mainly follows a strategy of conditionality in which 
the EU sets its rules as conditions that the CEECs have to fulfi l in order to receive EU re-
wards. These rewards consist of assistance and institutional ties ranging from trade and 
co-operation agreements via association agreements to full membership’ (ibid, 663). See 
also Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds), The Europeanization of Central and 
Eastern Europe (Cornell University Press 2005).
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a simple story of success or failure: whereas some studies reveal the re-
inforcing nature of the EU’s reward strategy, or positive conditionality,16 
others point to selective cherry-picking in the adoption of rules, as well 
as other ineffi ciencies of both positive and especially negative condition-
ality approaches in practice.17 Consensus is emerging within the scholar-
ly community, however, as regards direct correlations between the char-
acter of the EU’s reward (including, but not limited to, the membership 
perspective) and the effectiveness of conditionality − an assumption that 
has also been recently confi rmed by statistical analysis.18
Whereas debates advance on the substantial and implementing-pro-
cedural aspects of EU conditionality and Europeanisation practices, not 
many discussions dig into functional consequentialism-embracing ex-
planations. Oftentimes, this leads to treating these processes of EU-in-
duced transformation as auxiliary, and thus unrelated to nation- and 
state-building at large. By contrast, endeavouring to give causal effi cacy 
to the future (and thus embracing both causality and consequentialism), 
the current article develops a teleological approach to, and explanation 
of, EU-induced and EU-centric democratisation and state transformation 
processes as part of EU enlargement agendas, as well as broader struc-
tural frameworks for EU relations with its immediate neighbourhood. 
It is actually where the above-discussed EU-isation propositions, 
broadly seen, do intersect with theoretical propositions from the state the-
ory, including fi rst and foremost state-building and state-transformation 
(modernisation, transition, development) literatures. The 1989 Revolutions 
undoubtedly changed the parameters of state-building and democratic 
transition across East-Central Europe, even if, in some instances, as in 
Russia, the developments resembled more a ‘mimetic’ rather than a gen-
uine revolutionary change. The proliferating, from the mid-2000s, illiber-
al counterrevolutions, however, too, present equally constitutive turns in 
state transformation. As far as state modernisation paths are concerned, 
the menu of choice in the region is innately linked to the ‘choice for Europe’. 
For some authors, the notion of European integration actually resembles a 
‘triple modernization, encompassing economic, institutional and cultural 
changes’.19 An international political economy perspective on the practices 
16 Grabbe (n 6).
17 Dimitry Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality. Pre-accession Condi-
tionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law (Wolters Kluwer 2008).
18 Tanja A Börzel and Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘Coming Together or Drifting Apart? The EU’s 
Political Integration Capacity in Eastern Europe’ (2017) 24(2) Journal of European Public 
Policy 278.
19 Joanna Konieczna-Sałamatin and Maja Sawicka, ‘The East of the West, or the West of the 
East? Attitudes toward the European Union and European Integration in Poland after 2008’ 
(2020) East European Politics and Societies and Cultures (OnlineFirst) 1.
141CYELP 16 [2020] 133-177
of EU-induced state-building in Central and Eastern Europe, too, reveals 
salient developmental effects as a type of ‘collateral benefi t’ of European 
integration.20 In her comprehensive analysis of the EU’s passive and ac-
tive leverage on CEECs before their accession to the Union, Vachudova21 
uncovers the process and effects of political system modernisation and 
the reform of the state and economy in acceding countries. As far as the 
post-accession dynamics of nation-state transformation is concerned, the 
literature on the integration of ‘core state powers’, among others, presents 
valuable insights into the changing constellations of the gradual transi-
tion of certain state powers that have been integral in modern nation-state 
building (coercive − military and police − force; public fi nance; public ad-
ministration) to the realm of European integration.22
From this point of view, EU-isation, broadly seen, presents a crucial 
aspect of state-building processes in the region that essentially revolve 
around the gravity of European integration and identity, being at the 
same time inherently conducive to the European Union’s powerful drive 
towards building ‘ideal’ members and neighbours. Collaterality is there-
fore an engrained fundamental quality of the EU member/neighbour 
state-building paradigm as conceptualised below. 
The idea of EU ‘member state-building’ was inaugurated simultane-
ously with, and in the context of, the EU’s ‘big bang’ enlargement east-
wards that celebrated the largest-scale transformative revolution in Eu-
rope when eight CEECs joined the European Union in May 2004. In their 
idea-pioneering article, Knaus and Cox23 presented EU ‘member-state 
building’, in contrast to traditional capacity-building, as ‘a vastly more 
sophisticated form of institution-building’, ‘a model unique to the Eu-
ropean continent’. They went on to argue that ‘[t]his form of “regime 
change” EU-style is cheap, voluntary and hence long-lasting’.24 Casting a 
retrospective on the EU’s accomplished enlargements, Hillion25 even pon-
20 Lá szló Bruszt, Ludvig Lundstedt and Zsuzsa Munkacsi, ‘Collateral Benefi t: The Develop-
mental Effects of EU-Induced State Building in Central and Eastern Europe’ (2020) 27(5) 
Review of International Political Economy 1170.
21 Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after 
Communism (OUP 2005).
22 Philipp Genschel and Markus Jachtenfuchs (eds), Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The Eu-
ropean Integration of Core State Powers (OUP 2013); Philipp Genschel and Markus Jacht-
enfuchs, ‘From Market Integration to Core State Powers: The Eurozone Crisis, the Refugee 
Crisis and Integration Theory’ (2018) 56(1) Journal of Common Market Studies 178.
23 Gerald Knaus and Marcus Cox, ‘The “Helsinki Moment” in Southeastern Europe’ (2005) 
16(1) Journal of Democracy 40.
24 ibid, 41.
25 Christophe Hillion, ‘Accession and Withdrawal in the Law of the European Union’ in 
Anthony Arnull and Damian Chalmers (eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law 
(OUP 2015) 132.
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dered that ‘[t]he EU member-state-building policy […] has become a stan-
dard facet of the EU accession process’. Thereby, it is not just a one-di-
mensional formal legal status that has been undergoing transformation 
− in fact, through the evolving enlargement policy, the EU institutions 
‘have actively contributed to transforming applicant states into operat-
ing members of the Union, in constitutional, administrative and judicial 
terms, thereby articulating the attributes of EU membership’.26
When it comes to the EU’s state-transformative drive, the effort in 
building ‘ideal’ members and neighbours ranges across a whole set of 
the EU’s privileged partnerships, political association, market integra-
tion and other offers ‘between membership and non-membership’.27 There-
fore, the processes of EU-induced transformation in the countries of 
East-Central Europe should be regarded as at least two-track process-
es, with double transition pursued by the respective states at the same 
time. These are transition to democracy and transition from an ordinary 
nation-state to an EU member/neighbour state, which presupposes the 
articulation of a particular quality of Europeanised statehood.28
Even though, from their fi rst contractual relationship with the EC/
EU, the Baltic states had constantly been pressing for an accession per-
spective, it took the EU quite a while to grant one and let Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania bandwagon on the EU’s eastward enlargement. Due to im-
mense political and, more importantly, acquis conditionality, it took the 
Baltic countries even more time to transform ‘from post-Soviet republics 
to EU member states’,29 inasmuch as such a transformation implied not 
only dismantling the Communist and Soviet government ideologies and 
structures with the simultaneous build-up of democratic institutions. 
It also required developing certain qualities and standards of EU ‘mem-
ber-statehood’, which draw on the continually developing communitar-
ian acquis, ie the founding treaties, reform and accession treaties, the 
then-European Court of Justice’s case law, EU decision- and policy-mak-
ing rules and practices, etc.
26 ibid, 130.
27 Andriy Tyushka, Between Membership and Non-Membership in the European Union: 
Ukraine’s Actual and Potential Status (VDM Verlag 2010).
28 In the specifi c context of the Western Balkans, the EU’s member state-building effort 
goes well beyond just including the traditional focus on the implementation of the acquis 
and, as ‘a reaction to existing and perceived state weaknesses in the Western Balkans’, it 
furthermore resembles ‘an attempt by the EU to build states that fi t the standardised model 
of a “European state”’. See Soeren Keil and Zeynep Arkan, ‘Introduction: European Union 
Foreign Policy in the Western Balkans’ in Soeren Keil and Zeynep Arkan (eds), The EU and 
Member State Building: European Foreign Policy in the Western Balkans (Routledge 2015) 
6-7.
29 Peter Van Elsuwege, From Soviet Republics to EU Member States: A Legal and Political 
Assessment of the Baltic States’ Accession to the EU (Martinus Nijhoff 2008).
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First and foremost, EU ‘member state(hood)’ is understood as a le-
gal title conferred upon a European nation-state that becomes a full-
fl edged member of the European Union. Looking beyond the purely le-
galist realm of this EU-specifi c legal title, Bickerton30 suggests also to 
consider ‘member statehood’ as a ‘historically specifi c and distinctive 
form of state’, which ‘can be differentiated conceptually and in practice 
from earlier forms of state, most notably the modern nation state’. Argu-
ing that the process of state transition from an ‘ordinary’ nation-state to 
an EU ‘member state’, which chiefl y happens via the transformation of 
state-society relations, is the key driver of European integration, Bicker-
ton31 defi nes ‘member statehood’ as ‘a distinctive and stand-alone form of 
state’ that is ‘something far more extensive and signifi cant than merely a 
legal title’ − ‘[i]t refers to a form of state where power and authority is con-
stituted horizontally rather than vertically, through the participation by 
national by national governments in transnational networks of rule’. One 
of the defi ning ex-post characteristics of a nation-state’s transformation 
into an ‘EU member state’ is, in addition to legal and formal-organisa-
tional features, an outcome where ‘deliberation and consensus-making 
have become ends in themselves rather than means to a nationally stra-
tegic end’.32 Seen from that angle, the rationale and process of EU mem-
ber state-building also bears a distinct imprint on the understanding 
of ‘transition’ as such: if transition from non-democratic to democratic 
government could be traced back for its beginnings and the anticipated 
accomplishment to a specifi c moment in time, the transition to ‘EU mem-
ber statehood’ is a lasting process which evolves along with the evolution 
of EU policies, polity and identity as a supranational entity − and thus 
hardly stops (or at least is hardly due to stop). Applying the EU member 
state-building lens to the EU’s (foreign and enlargement) policy vis-à-vis 
the Western Balkans, Bieber33 argues that it is less reminiscent of the 
known EU politics of enlargement and is more creative in the sense that 
it encompasses a ‘long-distance’ state-building strategy.
Similarly, one can think of ‘neighbour state-building’ politics through 
the dense and partially overlapping web of multilateral (such as the 2004 
European Neighbourhood Policy or the 2009 Eastern Partnership) and 
30 Christopher J Bickerton, European Integration: From Nation-States to Member States 
(OUP 2012) 53.
31 Christopher J Bickerton, ‘A Union of Member States: State Transformation and the New 
Intergovernmentalism’ in Christopher Bickerton, Dermot Hodson and Uwe Puetter (eds), 
The New Intergovernmentalism: States and Supranational Actors in the Post-Maastricht Era 
(OUP 2015) 54.
32 ibid, 69.
33 Florian Bieber, ‘Building Impossible States? State-Building Strategies and EU Member-
ship in the Western Balkans’ (2011) 63(10) Europe-Asia Studies 1783.
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bilateral (Association Agreements, Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ments, other bilateral economic or comprehensive partnership deals) 
policy frameworks.34 In addition to the politically observable process of 
EU-isation of state-building processes in the countries of proximity, the 
very spirit and letter of (post-Lisbon reformed) EU Treaties, too, sets the 
imperative − a political mandate − for the EU ‘to engage with the neigh-
bours, precisely with a view to asserting its own values’, as Article 8 TEU 
(the so-called ‘neighbouring state-building policy’ clause) prescribes.35  
The Union’s ‘neighbour state-building’ politics is a discursively and 
politically discernible ‘sustainable [(geo)political] effort of the European 
Union to shape the neighbourhood according to its own “template”, that 
is to indirectly “build” would-be member states’.36 Regardless of whether 
or not the neighbouring states would be willing and able to access the 
EU any time soon, the Union’s strategy is to make the neighbourhood 
at least ‘compatible’ with what EU member-statehood requires. As the 
ties and transactions between the EU and its neighbours to the east 
are growing, the European Union has been increasingly keen, especially 
since its 2003/04 opening to a ‘wider Europe’, to promote the formation 
of a ‘ring of friends’, ie like-minded and like-governed states that, ideally, 
would mirror the EU’s ideal ‘Self’, which − for good and less so reasons 
− has been regarded in Brussels as a model for state development and 
governance. 
Undoubtedly, the idea of an EU-driven and EU-centric alignment 
beyond enlargement presents both a theoretical challenge for the mod-
ern/nation-state paradigm and a more practical dilemma for the pursuit 
of sovereignty by the newly independent states in the Union’s neighbour-
hood − this time, bound to oscillating between various forms of Brussels 
hegemony.37 It should be argued, however, that the EU’s normative and 
structural power exercise in the neighbourhood presents a different − 
deliberative and consensual − form of hegemony as it draws on voluntary 
(ie consent-based) political undertakings and a legal (ie contractual or 
34 Andriy Tyushka, ‘From “Member-State Building” to “Neighbour-State Building” Policy: 
Reconsidering the EU’s Approach towards the Eastern Neighbours’ (2014) Paper presented 
at the Global Europe Centre’s Conference ‘Europe’s Near Abroad: Building an Understand-
ing of the Changing Eastern Neighbourhood’, Canterbury, University of Kent, 30 June 2014.
35 Christophe Hillion, ‘Anatomy of EU Norm Export Towards the Neighbourhood: The Im-
pact of Article 8 TEU’ in Roman Petrov and Peter Van Elsuwege (eds), Legislative Approx-
imation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union 
(Routledge 2014) 18.
36 Andriy Tyushka, ‘Building the Neighbours: The EU’s New Association Agreements and 
Structural Power in the Eastern Neighbourhood’ (2017) 25(1) Journal of Contemporary 
Central and Eastern Europe 48.
37 See eg Christopher J Bickerton, ‘From Brezhnev to Brussels: Transformations of Sover-
eignty in Eastern Europe’ (2009) 46(6) International Politics 732.
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agreement-based) formalisation of the negotiated forms of relationship 
with third countries.38 Moreover, the third countries’ convergence with 
European Union norms and policies is a less asymmetric and straight-
forward (and thus much more nuanced and multi-layered) matter than it 
appears. In their seminal take on the patterns of policy convergence be-
tween the EU and its neighbourhoods, Barbé and others39 challenge the 
simplistic view, and posit that ‘there is more than just externalization’, 
as, in addition to convergence with the EU norms, there are at least two 
more layers to be observed, ie convergence towards international norms 
and one towards bilaterally developed norms. Thereby, the parameters of 
the individual neighbour states’ EU-style transformation present a much 
more diversifi ed set of − negotiated − state-building, modernisation, in-
stitutional and capacity-building as well as policy alignment choices 
than that of the EU member state-building process.
As such, the idea and process of EU ‘neighbour state-building’ has 
to be distinguished from other similarly resonating concepts, including 
the very liberal and post-liberal ideas of ‘international state-building’, 
or the processes of providing multiverse external support to domestic 
‘state-building’ efforts in countries that are lacking, repairing or reform-
ing their state institutions.40
Instead, the EU ‘neighbour state-building’ account is more ground-
ed in discussions on the intertwined nature of domestically driven 
state-building agendas (democratic transformation, transition, reforms) 
and externally incentivised forms of such transition that interact through 
the layers of foreign-political alignment, legislative approximation, polit-
ical association, and market integration.41 In a similar vein, Wolczuk42 
argues that ‘Ukraine’s European integration has become intertwined 
with statebuilding’. In that, she also draws on Orenstein, Bloom, and 
38 Back in 2007, the then-President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso 
dubbed the idea of the European Union itself as ‘the fi rst non-imperial empire’, not least 
because ‘the EU empire is built on voluntary pooling of power and not on military conquest’. 
See José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission (2004-2014), ‘European 
Union Is “Non-Imperial Empire”’ (Euractiv Youtube, 10 July 2007) <https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=-I8M1T-GgRU> accessed 20 July 2020.
39 Esther Barbé and others, ‘Drawing the Neighbours Closer … to What?: Explaining Emerg-
ing Patterns of Policy Convergence between the EU and Its Neighbours’ (2009) 44(4) Coop-
eration and Confl ict 380.
40 David Chandler, International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance (Rout-
ledge 2010); Anna-Sophie Maass, ‘The Actorness of the EU’s State-Building in Ukraine: 
Before and after Crimea’ (2020) 25(2) Geopolitics 387.
41 Andriy Tyushka, ‘Association-Cum-Integration: The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 
and “Association Law” as an Institution of Ukraine’s European Integration’ (2017) 13 Croa-
tian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 87.
42 Kataryna Wolczuk, ‘State Building and European Integration in Ukraine’ (2019) 60(6) Eur-
asian Geography and Economics 737.
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Lindstrom43 and applies their ‘quadruple transition’ framework (link-
ing simultaneously the processes of nation-state building, democratisa-
tion, marketisation, as well as integration) to the analysis of Ukraine’s 
‘state-building/European integration’ nexus, inasmuch as Ukraine’s 
‘project of nation-state building, democratization and marketization has 
been embedded within transnational agenda and pressures, most im-
portantly but not limited to those of the EU’.44 
Consequently, European Union ‘neighbour state-building’ should be 
regarded as a domestically driven but externally incentivised and exter-
nally conditioned (as well as externally assisted or directly supervised) 
process of domestic change in a neighbouring country to the particular 
rationality of both government and governance practices.
In practical terms, the process unfolds through the legislative and 
regulatory approximation of legal, political, socio-economic and busi-
ness-operational systems, which are operating within the EU’s extended 
(to the neighbourhood) governance structures, as well as the latter ones’ 
‘internalisation’ (both through domestic legitimation and ‘transplan-
tation’) into the neighbour-states’ domestic realms of governance.45 In 
certain cases, the ‘internalisation’ of EU governance rationalities with-
in domestic legal and political orders has profound legal consequenc-
es, for instance changing national constitutions by inserting so-called 
‘European and Euro-Atlantic integration’ clauses, as happened in the 
2014 EU-associated and long-time European integration-oriented Geor-
gia (2017) and Ukraine (2019).46 To a lesser degree, changes in at least 
‘constitutional identity’ can be observed in the context of Europeani-
sation through even less-ambitious EU bilateral agreements with its 
neighbour states, such as the 2017 EU-Armenia Comprehensive and En-
hanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA).47 Substantially, the processes of 
EU neighbour state-building extend well beyond discursive frames and 
geopolitical narratives, cultural affi nities, policy emulation or political 
simulations − they reach into quintessential constitutional-legal and 
identitarian fabrics of nation- and state-building.
43 M Orenstein, S Bloom, and N Lindstrom, ‘A Fourth Dimension of Transition’ in M Oren-
stein, S Bloom, and N Lindstrom (eds), Transitional Actors in Central and East European 
Transitions (University of Pittsburgh Press 2008) 6.
44 Wolczuk (n 42) 737.
45 Tyushka (n 36) 49-55.
46 For a more detailed analysis of constitutional change in response to Europeanisation 
in select post-Soviet states, see Roman Petrov and Peter Van Elsuwege (eds), Post-Soviet 
Constitutions and Challenges of Regional Integration: Adapting to European and Eurasian 
Integration Projects (Routledge 2017).
47 See eg Anna Khvorostiankina, ‘Europeanization through EU External Agreements and 
the Issue of “Constitutional Identity”: The Case of the EU-Armenia CEPA’ (2018) 4 Kyiv-Mo-
hyla Law and Politics Journal 15.
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Notably, in contrast to EU ‘member state-building’ politics, with its 
overemphasis on accession conditionality, the ‘neighbour state-build-
ing process’ unfolds in differently conditioned frameworks of the Euro-
pean Union’s positive incentives and negative conditionality clauses (ie 
differentiated conditionality: ‘more for more’ and ‘less for less’, respec-
tively). Last but not least, the practices of EU member and neighbour 
state-building are neither mutually exclusive nor mutually determinis-
tic: transition between the two can (but does not have to) happen − and if 
it does, it proceeds not necessarily in a linear way. In addition to EU-ac-
cession aspiring neighbours in South-Eastern Europe, there are, for in-
stance, other European neighbours (Switzerland, EEA states) that do not 
pursue any membership in the European Union. On the other hand, the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU clearly demonstrates that a neighbour-to-
member-to-neighbour transition is not impossible either. The ties that 
are expected to bind the EU and UK post-Brexit, however, will not allow 
this transition to revert back to the point of UK being an ‘ordinary’ na-
tion-state − there is no comeback to the status quo ante.48 The lasting 
and sustainable effects of EU member- or neighbour-statehood are thus 
central to the consequentialist logic of European Union member and 
neighbour state-building.
3 Mission ‘Transition’: from ‘post-Communist’ states to European 
Union associates 
After (re)gaining their independence in 1989/90 following the col-
lapse of communism, the fall of the ‘Eastern Bloc’ and the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union itself, most East-Central European countries started 
pursuing their ‘return to Europe’ in both discursive and political terms − 
chiefl y via transitioning to liberal democratic and market-based political 
and economic systems, as well as seeking integration with Western insti-
tutions including the European Union and NATO. In political, economic 
and legal terms, such a ‘return to Europe’ of the CEECs was set to unfold 
initially as a process of drawing the post-Communist countries closer 
48 Even though the Brexit campaign, as a sovereigntist move, revolved around the motto of 
‘taking back control’, ie restoring the UK’s full sovereignty in decision-making, it is hardly 
imaginable that, under any constellation of post-Brexit EU-UK structured engagement, the 
need for the pooling of sovereignty will be ruled out. Managing EU-UK and inter-state ex-
ternalities in trade and services at the very least will still necessitate shared law-making, 
binding for both parties, practised self-restraint in view of the political commitments un-
dertaken, as well as the pooling of sovereignty for the sake of joint decision-making. Con-
sequently, the reality of sovereignty post-Brexit is more complex than conventionally por-
trayed, as admitted, for instance, by British MP Lord Wallace. See Lord Wallace, ‘The Reality 
of ‘Sovereignty’ Post-Brexit Is More Complex Than the Government Lets On’ (PoliticsHome, 
31 March 2020) <www.politicshome.com/thehouse/article/the-reality-of-sovereignty-post-
brexit-is-more-complex-than-the-government-lets-on> accessed 18 August 2020.
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to the European Union (and thus − transition) via association, but soon 
it transformed into a more comprehensive process of politico-economic 
state transformation via EU accession.
Following two decades of stagnation in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
CEECs’ transition from a planned to a market-based economy was any-
thing but a quick and easy process, and neither was their political tran-
sition from closed, widely authoritarian socialist and communist regimes 
to open and liberal democratic orders. Exceptions applied, of course, in 
particular regarding the Baltic states, which just regained their indepen-
dence after the semicentennial Soviet rule, and Hungary. The latter had 
opened up quite early enough to allow for an intensifi ed exchange with 
the Western world and was better-placed to pursue democratic transi-
tion due to the ‘lighter’ version of communism it introduced following the 
1956 revolution, which allowed for greater cultural diversity and person-
al freedoms, as well as featuring elements of a regulated-market econo-
my (so-called ‘goulash communism’ or Kadarism). Poland’s case is a vivid 
example of how a shock to the system triggered a simultaneous political 
and economic transition in a very short period: the 1989 victory of the 
SolidarnoπÊ opposition movement, founded as a trade union in 1980, and 
the subsequent formation of an all-party Christian-democratic govern-
ment paved the way for the establishment of liberal democracy and a 
free-market economy; the ‘shock therapy’ approach to economic reform, 
introduced by fi nance minister Leszek Balcerowicz (known as the ‘Bal-
cerowicz plan’), brought about a swift transformation of the country’s 
economic foundations.
Whereas the international-systemic preconditions created momen-
tum for Central and East European states’ democratisation and free-mar-
ketisation, the profound transformation processes in the countries were 
chiefl y boosted and sustained by their drive to ‘return to Europe’.49 Thus, 
the (hi)story of the CEECs’ post-1989 transformation is inherently a story 
of their EU and NATO accessions and their performance as members of 
an integrated and institutionalised Europe.
As soon as the post-Soviet Baltic republics and other post-socialist 
East-Central European states charted their pro-integrationist Europe-
an development paths in the early 1990s, the EC-12 (and, from 1995, 
the EU-15) were quick to embrace and support the CEECs in their fun-
damental political and economic reconstruction agendas − even if the 
prospect of the CEECs’ EU membership was generally regarded by the 
EU’s decision-makers as unrealistic any time soon. By an overwhelming 
49 Andrew Roberts, ‘Democracy and Democratisation in Post-Communist Europe’ in Adam 
Fagan and Petr Kopecky (eds), The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics (Routledge 
2018).
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majority, the EC-12 citizens welcomed in 1991 the then-Community’s 
enlargement to the Baltic (72%) and other Soviet (61%) states, whereas 
only 15% and 22% of European citizens objected to such a move, re-
spectively.50 Remarkably, these were the British who were most positive 
about the EC’s enlargement to both the Baltic (81%) and the Soviet (76%) 
republics.51 The 1999 Flash Eurobarometer no 68 shows, however, that 
the EU-15 was not equally optimistic when it came to the assessment of 
real possibilities for former Socialist and post-Soviet Baltic states to join 
the EU in the nearest future: while, in general, the majority held the view 
that only Hungary (56%), Poland (55%) and conditionally Czechia (50%) 
would likely make it to become EU members soon, only about a third of 
EU citizens thought that Romania (29%), Bulgaria (28%) and Estonia 
(24%) would make it, too, in the near future.52 Any quick moves along 
this path were also discouraged by the majority of the then-EU member 
states. 
Being itself busy with its EFTAn enlargement round53 and preparing 
for the launch of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the European 
Union saw itself far from ready to absorb a further dozen states-in-trans-
formation from the changing region. 
The June 1993 Copenhagen European Council was a game-changer 
in the sense that, in anticipation of the CEECs’ forthcoming EU mem-
bership applications, it, for the fi rst time ever, formulated the condi-
tions for EU accession (widely known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’).54 The 
1993 European Council Conclusions put it explicitly that ‘the associated 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become 
50 Flash Eurobarometer No 6: ‘EG-Bürger und Manager Meinung zu: EG-Mitgliedschaft der 
Baltischen- und der Sowjetrepubliken; EG-Initiativen in Jugoslawien; Allgemeiner Agrarpo-
litikreform; Sommer-Streiks in der EG-Kommission’ (9-23 September 1991) 2.
51 ibid, 3
52 Flash Eurobarometre 68: ‘L’élargissement de l’Union Européenne’ (20 July 1999) 7.
53 The 1995 Enlargement of the European Union (aka ‘the EFTAn Round’) included the 
accession of three of the European Free Trade Association’s (EFTA) members − Europe’s 
neutral states of Austria, Finland and Sweden.
54 Essentially, the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ for EU accession laid out a set of economic and 
political system-related preconditions for EU membership-fi tness of the candidate coun-
tries and anchored the EU’s own absorption capacity as a necessary precondition for any 
future enlargement: ‘Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability 
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the ca-
pacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership 
presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. The Union’s capacity to 
absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also 
an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate 
countries’ (European Council (n 55) 13).
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members of the European Union’, whereby ‘[a]ccession will take place as 
soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of mem-
bership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required’.55 
Essentially, these preconditions included, inter alia, the would-be EU 
member states’ achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democra-
cy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for, and protection of, mi-
norities − all of which have become, in recent years, points of contention 
between the EU institutions, ‘old’ member states and some ‘new(er)’ Eu-
rope countries. The Copenhagen criteria were introduced to ensure both 
political and economic convergence between ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU member 
states − and the commitment and ability of the latter to adopt and effec-
tively implement EU laws and policies, ie the EU acquis. Seen from the 
member state-building perspective, the Copenhagen criteria represent 
not only basic legal aspects of EU enlargement56 − they embody some 
of the core socio-economic, political-administrative, legal and constitu-
tional parameters of EU member-statehood, which since then has also 
become developed through several rounds of treaty revisions, EU-level 
adjudication on the nature of EU law, the member states’ obligations and 
responsibility for infringements, internal market freedoms, etc, as well 
as the ensuing consensual-political practices.
In March 1994, Hungary became the fi rst CEEC to apply for EU 
membership. Within the next two years, all of the CEEC-10 had fi led 
their EU accession applications. As the state and pace of reforms in the 
then-associated CEECs differed, the European Commission recommend-
ed, in its Agenda 2000 Communication of July 1997,57 the opening of 
negotiations with only fi ve of them (namely, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia), while halting negotiations with the other 
half until their economic (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slo-
vakia) and political (Slovakia) transitions were further advanced. Cyprus 
was, too, included in the fi rst-wave negotiations, whilst Malta had then 
temporarily suspended its application. Thus, in March 1998, the Europe-
an Council launched negotiations with the ‘5+1 fi rst wave’ EU accession 
candidates, whereas the other half were stuck in the waiting room until 
early 2000. Following the 1999 Helsinki European Council, both the 
opening of accession negotiations with the ‘5+1 second-wave’ states and 
the overall revision of the enlargement strategy ensued. Even though the 
55 European Council in Copenhagen, ‘Conclusions of the Presidency’ (21-22 June 1993) 13 
<www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf> accessed 20 July 2020.
56 Thomas Bruha and Oliver Vogt, ‘Rechtliche Grundlagen der EU-Erweiterung’ (1997) 
30(4) Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 477.
57 Commission, ‘Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union’ COM(97)200 fi nal 
(Strasbourg, 15 July 1997) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
DOC_97_6> accessed 20 July 2020.
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1999 Council conclusions warned against any ‘wholesale’ approaches 
and prescribed decision-making on the CEECs’ accession in each case 
individually (based on a country’s progress in negotiations), ultimately, 
the EU’s fourth (the so-called ‘10+2’ or ‘big bang’) enlargement round of 
2004/07 involved effectively all ten Central and Eastern European coun-
tries (CEECs) and the two Mediterranean islands of Malta and Cyprus. 
Whereas the accession treaties with eight CEECs and Malta and Cyprus 
were duly signed in April 2003 (with their EU accession planned for May 
2004), two CEECs − Bulgaria and Romania − lagged behind in their re-
forms and negotiations for several more years, owing such a delay not 
least to the protracted corruption in the public sphere and the ‘fragile ro-
bustness’ of their judicial and public administration systems, until they 
fi nally joined the EU in January 2007.
Whereas the circumstances of individual countries varied, most of 
the 2004/07 CEECs admittees to the EU had been undergoing wholesale 
transformation of their social-political, institutional, and economic or-
ders. It was clear that the European Union would be profoundly changed 
by that enlargement − the mission was not to let the EU become weak-
ened by it. Contractual frameworks, with thoroughly stipulated trans-
formation and approximation agendas, benchmarks and rewards (from 
fi nancial and technical assistance to EU membership for those who suc-
cessfully complete the path of becoming EUropean), the so-called ‘Eu-
rope Agreements’, were seen as appropriate tools to prepare both the 
candidate states for their EU accession and the European Union itself 
for this uptake.
Re-designed into pre-accession tools, the EU’s association agree-
ments with the CEECs (aka ‘Europe Agreements’)58 were all seeking to fa-
cilitate the 1989-commenced economic and political transition of Central 
and Eastern European states, and foresaw economic aid therefor − but 
each pursued distinct areas of intervention. As scrupulously observed 
by Phinnemore,59 distinct Europe Agreements had aimed to ‘support the 
efforts of the associate “to complete the conversion to a market economy” 
(Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia), “make 
progress towards realizing […] economic freedoms on which the EC is 
based” (Hungary), and “consolidate […] democracy” (Romania)’, as well as 
‘“to provide decisive support for the implementation of reform and to help 
58 Initially, the European Commission was not planning to include EU membership as an 
objective of EU-CEECs Association Agreements but just to reassure the countries that the 
‘association’ relationship would not anyhow preclude the possibility of them gaining mem-
bership. Cf Commission, ‘Association Agreements with the Countries of Central and East-
ern Europe: A General Outline’ COM(90)398 fi nal (Brussels, 27 August 1990).
59 David Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to Membership? (Sheffi eld 
Academic Press 1999) 44.
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[the associate] cope with economic and social consequences of structural 
readjustment” (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Slove-
nia)’. In addition to fi nancial cooperation and the special technical and 
pre-accession assistance programmes (such as PHARE),60 the making of 
the CEECs EU membership-fi t was facilitated by political dialogue, legis-
lative and regulatory approximation and gradual policy harmonisation − 
fi rst and foremost, in the horizontal areas of competition and state aid.61
From among the CEECs, the three Baltic states − Estonia, Lat-
via and Lithuania − present a unique collective case of by far the only 
post-Soviet republics that rapidly and successfully ‘returned to Europe’. 
In fact, their ‘re-becoming’ European was only formalised via successive 
EU and NATO accessions, as even when they had been part of the Soviet 
Union, the Baltic republics were substantially regarded as ‘intrinsically 
European’ states, a quasi-abroad, rather than genuinely belonging to 
the Soviets.62 Still, after more than forty years of Soviet occupation and 
‘de-Europeanisation’, ‘catching up’ with the CEECs was looming large 
− and, thus, rather unsurprisingly, the political and economic condi-
tionality (including the anchoring of the respect for democratic princi-
ples and human rights as well as the principles of a market economy 
as ‘essential elements’ of the agreements) were enhanced in the EU’s 
association agreements with the Baltic states when compared to the Eu-
rope Agreements with other CEECs.63 As carefully observed by Graney,64 
whereas the ‘post-Soviet Lithuania has highlighted its long tradition of 
independent statehood under the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and as part 
of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’, ‘the “re-Europeanization” of 
Estonian and Latvian history after the Soviet interlude emphasized the 
long European pedigree of these states and peoples, including the asser-
tion that they had been part of Europe at least since Roman times’. In 
addition to this discursive rejoining of Europe by being ‘convincingly Eu-
ropean’, the then-demonstrated and sustained ability of the Baltic states 
60 PHARE had been the EU pre-accession support programme originally allocated in 1989 
for Poland and Hungary, an acronym from the offi cial title ‘Poland and Hungary: Assistance 
for Restructuring Economies’ (Phare). Since 1990, Phare has been extended to Bulgaria, 
Czechia, Slovakia, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Albania and other European 
countries (seventeen in total by 2000).
61 Cf, eg, Commission, ‘The Europe Agreements and Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Accession’ (Communication) COM(94) 320 
fi nal. 
62 Bruce Grant, The Captive and the Gift: Cultural Histories of Sovereignty in Russia and the 
Caucasus (Cornell University Press 2009) 154.
63 Elsuwege (n 29) 129-155.
64 Katherine Graney, Russia, the Former Soviet Republics, and Europe since 1989: Transfor-
mation and Tragedy (OUP 2019) 179.
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to ‘act European’65 facilitated what can be regarded as the most success-
ful case of resilient transition and transformation qua Europeanisation.
4 Under (re)construction: European Union member state-building 
through the CEECs’ re-Europeanisation and the arrival of the 
‘new’ EU member states 
The EU’s biggest-ever 2004 enlargement to countries of East-Cen-
tral Europe, which had been in traction since the mid-1990s, presented 
something truly mesmerising and challenging at the same time − not 
least as the joining of a whole new cohort of states could halt institution-
al functioning, decision-making or even the very idea of a ‘union’. The 
necessity to reform the EU had thus already been looming large past 
Amsterdam-199766 − the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of 2000, 
the reformed Treaty of Nice (2001) and the ‘Future of Europe’ debate fol-
lowing the 2001 Laeken Declaration all sought to prepare the EU, in one 
way or another, for the ‘big bang’ enlargement. 
The European public, too, had been watching the process cautious-
ly. When it comes to the challenges for the EU in enlarging eastwards, 
EU citizens identifi ed in early 2003 the following three nearly equally 
salient priorities, with the promotion of democracy within the EU de-
cision-making processes seen as the prime objective (27%), followed by 
the need to strengthen the Union’s foreign and security policies (23%), 
and the need to promote an exchange of experiences and good practices 
between older and newer member states (19%), respectively.67 
To ensure that the EU’s decision-making capacity, the acquis com-
munautaire and unity would be neither impaired nor undermined, a mul-
tidimensional process of ‘re-Europeanisation’ was set in motion. Thereby, 
the CEECs’ ‘return to Europe’ was facilitated through distinct catch-up, 
convergence- and transformation-oriented assistance programmes. Dis-
tinct democratic transition- and market access-related conditionality68 
mechanisms were integrated in those assistance programmes as part 
of reward and sanctioning tools. Quintessentially, the democratic and 
65 ibid, 177. For a more detailed analysis, see ibid, 171-209.
66 The 1996 IGC, too, focused on preparing the EU institutionally for enlargement, but the 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty revision largely failed to deliver on this goal. Right after the Amster-
dam European Council, the European Commission published in July 1997 its infl uential 
Communication Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, which served as a blueprint 
for the post-EFTAn enlargement strategy. See Commission (n 57).
67 Flash Eurobarometer 140: ‘Enlargement of the European Union’ (11 April 2003) 33.
68 Geoffrey Pridham, ‘Change and Continuity in the European Union’s Political Condi-
tionality: Aims, Approach, and Priorities’ (2007) 14(3) Democratization 446; Luca Tomini, 
Democratizing Central and Eastern Europe. Successes and Failures of the European Union 
(Routledge 2015).
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free-market conditionality mattered equally for both the CEECs’ own 
transformation and their transition to ‘EU member statehood’ inasmuch 
as ‘the rule of law and open economies’ have long been regarded as ‘two 
sides of the same coin’, as emphasised by the 2004-2014 President of the 
European Commission José Manuel Barroso.69
For the CEECs to catch up with the EU average in terms of economic 
growth and income, the European Union invested massively to support 
the new member states’ drive − fi rst, through its Cohesion policy (set up in 
1994) and, since 2014, through the Investment Plan for Europe (aka ‘the 
Juncker Plan’). As a result, from 2003 through 2017, GDP per capita in 
the ten new EU member states grew unprecedentedly by 84%.70 A wealth 
of other positive results on the ground included the bettering of socio-eco-
nomic conditions, business and investment, infrastructure, connectivity, 
as well as the quality of life in general. In the case of Poland, for instance, 
these thirty years of transformation have allowed the country to consider-
ably narrow the gap in the level of socio-economic development compared 
with developed countries: if in 1989 the estimated average GDP per capita 
(PPP) made up only 34.2% of the G7 countries’ PPP average, by 2019 it had 
already increased to 61.7%.71 Steady growth has also been noted in labour 
productivity and gross savings rates thirty years on.
The positive image and the narratives of enlargement success could 
also be identifi ed in EU public attitudes. In contrast to the worries ex-
pressed in the 2003 Eurobarometer surveys, in 2009, EU citizens over-
whelmingly saw the integration of the CEECs into the EU in terms of 
possibilities and added values, rather than as challenges, inasmuch as 
92% regarded the Union’s 2004/07 eastward enlargement conducive to 
increased opportunities to move and travel freely within Europe, 76% 
agreed that the enlargement had contributed to modernisation and 
growth in CEEC economies, 73% held that it facilitated the spread of 
democratic values and protection of human rights and, equally, 73% 
69 José MD Barroso, ‘The Rule of Law and Open Economies − Two Sides of the Same Coin’, 
Speech by EC President Barroso (14/403), Brussels, 22 May 2014, <https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_14_403> accessed 18 September 2019.
70 Commission, ‘Reconciling Europe’s Geography with Its History: Commission Marks 15th 
Anniversary of 2004 Enlargement’, 30 April 2019 <https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/
en/newsroom/news/2019/04/30-04-2019-reconciling-europe-s-geography-with-its-his-
tory-commission-marks-15th-anniversary-of-2004-enlargement> accessed 30 April 2019. 
For general and country-specifi c data on EU-CEEC convergence and cohesion policies, see 
also Commission, ‘Growing Together: EU Support to Member States that Joined in 2004 
(Factsheet)’ 30 April 2019 <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/growing-to-
gether-eu-support-member-states-joined-2004_en> accessed 30 April 2019 . 
71 Marcin Zieliński, ‘Tak Polskę zbudowano. 30-lecie planu Balcerowicza’ (Gazeta Wyborcza, 
1 January 2020) <https://wyborcza.pl/7,75968,25559301,tak-polske-zbudowano-30-le-
cie-planu-balcerowicza.html> accessed 20 July 2020.
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were convinced that the enlargement had helped increase the European 
Union’s global role,72 among other things.
About 7 in 10 EU citizens (58%) agreed in 2009 that the 2004/07 
enlargement had helped to preserve security and stability in Europe (not 
least by allowing for progress in the fi ght against organised crime and il-
legal immigration), whereas at least half or more respondents worryingly 
considered that the enlargement had: made the enlarged EU more diffi -
cult to manage (66%); contributed to job losses in their country (56%); 
caused problems because of divergent cultural traditions of the new 
member states (54%); led to an increased feeling of insecurity (50%) in 
the European Union as a whole.73
Naturally, the reshaping of the EU’s political system and strate-
gic milieu for multi-level policy-making in principle, not least by nearly 
doubling its membership, has seen the intensifi cation of (temporal, geo-
graphical and policy-specifi c) differentiation trends criss-crossing EU-
rope. It has incrementally been seen turning into a ‘two-speed’, ‘multi-
speed’, ‘multi-tier’ and so forth differentiated Union (commonly referred 
to as a ‘variable geometry Europe’) as the quantity and issue-areas of en-
hanced cooperation, advanced integration as well as persistent ‘opt-outs’ 
started proliferating − from the Schengen area to the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ), from the Eurozone area to the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) or enhanced Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), etc. 
Looking into the manifold dimensions of constitutional and instrumen-
tal differentiation in the European Union, Schimmelfennig and Winzen74 
discovered that the founding members of the EU almost never stayed 
out of any deepening of European integration, whereas other ‘old’ mem-
ber states, in particular the UK, Ireland and Sweden, account for 50% 
of all differentiation (‘opt-out’) clauses. Similarly, the state and politics 
of differentiated integration vary among the ‘new’ EU member states, 
with ‘some of the 2004 accession countries [likely to be] in the process 
of transitioning into trajectories similar to Britain or Denmark’.75 On a 
general level, however, within about ten years after their EU accession, 
the ‘new’ member states from East-Central Europe had become nearly 
fully integrated at treaty-level and converged with ‘old’ member states in 
the dimension of legislative differentiation.76
72 Flash Eurobarometer 257: ‘Views on European Union Enlargement’ (February 2009) 5.
73 ibid, 30.
74 Frank Schimmelfennig and Thomas Winzen, Ever Looser Union: Differentiated European 
Integration (OUP 2020) 58.
75 ibid, 59.
76 ibid, 107-119.
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Of course, the results of transformation and Europeanisation on 
the ground are much more complex and ambivalent than allowing a 
simplistic yes/no answer to a question on its success. Both among the 
‘new’ EU member states and the ‘older’ ones, the CEECs’ transformation 
qua EU enlargement is seen at best as a mixed success. Early signs of 
scepticism about the transformative power of European integration and 
the unfi nished transition of CEECs were already noticed in the 2005 
failed referenda on the EU constitution in France and the Netherlands, 
where the EU’s unpopularity was inter alia blamed on the ‘new’ EU mem-
bers. Social tensions across the EU (both along the old East/West divide 
and the emerging liberal/illiberal rupture) became even more pronounced 
with new-era systemic shocks, such as the Russian aggression against 
Ukraine, Europe and the liberal democratic order more generally, the 
rise of radical parties in Europe, the Euro and the migration crisis, the 
arrival of the post-truth era, etc.
5 Europeanisation revisited: an illiberal turn, (varied) transition 
resilience and de-democratisation trends in EU member states 
Democratic governance, the rule of law, respect for fundamental 
freedoms and human rights are not only at the heart of the EU’s member 
state-building drive but also constitute a salient agenda in the Union’s 
external relations, underpinned by a differentiated conditionality policy. 
Within the EU itself, however, the safeguarding of the above-mentioned 
values and principles has until recently remained a largely theoretical ex-
ercise as, effectively, no post-accession conditionality mechanisms have 
been put in place. Acceding to the European Union, the CEECs success-
fully pursued their longed-for ‘return to Europe’. Conditionality-induced 
Europeanisation has substantially driven the EU’s ‘new’ member states’ 
liberal-democratic and market-economic transitions. With the loss of the 
most credible incentive − ie the EU accession/membership perspective 
− the CEECs’ post-accession trajectories of democratic performance and 
EU member state-building seem to have lost traction and, in certain 
cases, direction.
Examining the credibility and sustainability of conditionality-in-
duced Europeanisation in the EU’s Central and East European ‘new’ 
member states, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier77 fi nd that incen-
tive-driven pre-accession Europeanisation loses its force in post-acces-
sion conditions, thus affecting the determinacy of compliance; further-
more, the absence of positive rewards (and, thus, the possibility of only 
77 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘The Europeanization of Eastern Europe: 
The External Incentives Model Revisited’ (2020) 27(6) Journal of European Public Poli-
cy 814.
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negative conditionality − ie sanctions − being applied) in post-accession 
conditions and the lack of credible, specifi ed and effective mechanisms 
of post-accession democratic conditionality, which could clearly commu-
nicate/elicit the costs of non-compliance, disincentivise compliance in 
principle (especially when it comes to non-acquis matters). Nonetheless, 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s78 comparative study reveals that ‘[t]
here is no general and sustained deterioration of democracy in the CEE 
new member states, [… but] there are cases in which backsliding clearly 
manifests itself in breaches of liberal democratic rules’, namely Hungary 
(since 2010), Poland (since 2015) and Romania (temporarily, in 2013).79 
In addition to generally sustained liberal-democratic compliance post-ac-
cession, most of the CEE ‘new’ member states also ‘outperform most old 
member states’, with the exception of Poland that ‘has become a compli-
ance laggard in the enlarged EU’.80 
Still, the slow(ed) progress and sporadic setbacks of Europeanisa-
tion and the (under)performance of member-statehood in a number of 
‘new’ EU member states appear a considerable challenge for the EU in 
the face of its internal discontents and misdevelopments. These include, 
but are not limited to, the UK’s departure, or ‘Brexit’, the rise of populism 
and the radical right,81 as well as the broader international circumstanc-
es, such as the crisis of liberal-democratic transformation and the liberal 
international order more generally. Such developments cannot but cast a 
shadow on the successes and sustainability of democratic and socio-eco-
nomic ‘transformation qua Europeanisation’, as well as the resilience of 
transition to EU member-statehood. The United Kingdom’s lasting and 
disenchanting withdrawal from the European Union unprecedentedly 
proves that EU member-statehood can be undone also quite formally and 
legally − and accomplished even after building-up such a status for over 
four decades of membership. Not surprisingly, the rise of contentious 
populist politics, illiberalism and Euroscepticism elicit concerns about 
(even the scantest) possibility of any next disintegration moves − ‘Polexit’, 
‘Czech-out’, ‘Slovakexit’, ‘Hungarexit’, or ‘Italeave’, etc, as popular public 
and political discursive frames incrementally suggest.
78 ibid, 821.
79 Similar conclusions were made in the earlier-published statistical analysis by Börzel and 
Schimmelfennig (n 18) 283. See also Daniel Bochsler and Andreas Juon, ‘Authoritarian 
Footprints in Central and Eastern Europe’ (2020) 36(2) East European Politics 167.
80 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (n 77) 820.
81 Bojan BugariË, ‘The Rise of Nationalist-Authoritarian Populism and the Crisis of Lib-
eral Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe’ in Uladzislau Belavusau and Aleksandra 
Gliszczyńska-Grabias (eds), Constitutionalism under Stress (OUP 2020) 21-37.
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In November 2018, European Council President Donald Tusk pon-
dered on the multiple crises that have been unfolding in EUrope since 
the late 2000s: 
We have a situation inside the European Union, a situation which is il-
lustrated most clearly by Brexit − the departure of the United Kingdom 
from the European Union, but also many other negative phenomena 
− […] the rise of nationalism and anti-European, not only rhetoric, but 
also anti-European emotion, in many European capitals.82 
Added to this is the rise of illiberalism with the simultaneous de-
cline of democracy, among other ontological crises of European integra-
tion and union.
The relative decline of democracy and the slowdown of the fourth 
and subsequent waves of democratisation worldwide have triggered the 
emergence of hybrid forms of semi-democratic government, most com-
monly referred to as ‘illiberal democracy’, which many thinkers would 
fi nd an illogical, oxymoronic and self-defeating term. As ‘liberal vs illiber-
al’ cracks have also appeared on the political map of EUrope, it comes as 
no surprise that the latter one, too, has become redefi ned in such terms. 
Currently, two substantially different contemporary ways of defi ning Eu-
rope and Europeanness can be singled out. As deftly summarised by 
Graney,83 the fi rst is ‘“a modern, EU-oriented” view of Europe, “embraced 
mainly by elites,” that is predominantly secular and based on the posses-
sion of more extrinsic characteristics based on common fi delity to values 
and behaviours such as liberal democracy, tolerance, and human rights’; 
the second is ‘more populist and fi nds Europe to be essentially “a group 
of white, Christian peoples that see themselves constituting a distinct 
civilization”’. The former is ‘the cosmopolitan, the civic, and the liberal 
view, according to which Europe is chiefl y a values-based civilization’, 
whereas the latter is an ‘illiberal, communal and cultural’ view, which 
is ‘based on intrinsic characteristics that certain “European” countries 
and peoples have developed as a result of their historical experience’.84
In light of the above divisions, again, the perception has resurfaced 
of East-Central Europe being at once both ‘Europe but not Europe’.85
82 Donald Tusk, ‘Poland and Europe. Two Anniversaries, Two Lessons’, Speech by Euro-
pean Council President Donald Tusk, 11 November 2018 <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
press/press-releases/2018/11/10/speech-by-president-donald-tusk-november-11-2018-
poland-and-europe-two-anniversaries-two-lessons/> accessed 18 September 2020.
83 Graney (n 64) 43.
84 ibid.
85 Maria Mälksoo, The Politics of Becoming European: A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold 
War Security Imaginaries (Routledge 2010) 57.
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In his book Counter-Revolution: Liberal Europe in Retreat, Zielonka86 
explores the undercurrents of the proliferating counter-revolution in Eu-
rope which risks throwing back East-Central Europe to the past inas-
much as the space for the liberal project is shrinking there due to both 
endogenous and particularly exogenous pressures of ‘anti-liberal insur-
gents’ from all over the continent. He clearly makes a case for such an 
anti-liberal revolution unfolding well beyond the hotly debated cases of 
Hungary and Poland:87 
Today, the entirety of Europe is in a state of confusion, with the lib-
eral system beginning to crumble not just in Warsaw and Budapest, 
but also in London, Amsterdam, Madrid, Rome, Athens, and Paris. Eu-
rope’s citizens feel insecure and angry. Their leaders look incompetent 
and dishonest. Their entrepreneurs seem frantic and distressed. Polit-
ical violence is on the rise, chiefl y because of terrorism, but not just.88
It looks, though, that the resurrected good-old East/West divide in 
Europe no longer runs strictly across geographical or historical lines − 
but incrementally along the emerging identitarian watershed of ‘liberal/
illiberal’ EUrope. 
Nonetheless, these were the two ‘new’ EU member states from the 
2004/07 Eastern enlargement round − Poland and Hungary − that had 
fi ngers pointed at them fi rst when Brussels decided to withstand the tide 
of illiberalisation and thus to seriously − ie by way of legal action − en-
force the rule of law and democracy within the European Union.
Against all original fears and expectations about the imminent po-
tential diffi culties associated with the inclusion to the EU of fairly young 
East-Central European democracies, Article 7 TEU, introduced into the 
EU Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam back in 1997, found its application 
only after some twenty years. Article 7 TEU, or the so-called ‘yellow card’, 
provides for ‘a special decision-making procedure, with limited jurisdic-
tion for the Court of Justice’, which is to be enacted in order ‘to warn a 
Member State which might commit a serious and persistent breach’ of 
the principles and values upon which the European Union is founded, as 
expressed inter alia in Art 2 TEU.89 It was not until Poland and Hungary 
86 Jan Zielonka, Counter-Revolution: Liberal Europe in Retreat (OUP 2018). See also Jan 
Zielonka and Jacques Rupnik, ‘From Revolution to ‘Counter- Revolution’: Democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe 30 Years On’ (2020) 72(6) Europe-Asia Studies 1073.
87 Importantly, it was the Netherlands and France (not any of the ‘new’ EU member states) 
that in 2005 failed the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) and thus further 
integration, liberalisation and constitutionalisation of the EU.
88 Zielonka (n 86) x.
89 Steve Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law: EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Vol-
ume I: EU Immigration and Asylum Law, OUP 2016) 50. Notably, the so-called ‘yellow 
card’ procedure as applicable within the EU’s area of freedom, security and justice (ie Art 
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celebrated their fi fteenth anniversary of EU membership that Art 7 TEU 
was triggered for the fi rst time ever.90 
It is hard to disagree with Zielonka91 that Poland ‘has grown more 
than any European country over the past decade, yet in 2015 the major-
ity of Poland’s electorate supported a counter-revolutionary party cam-
paigning on an anti-liberal and anti-European ticket’; in the meantime, 
in Hungary, which was doing less well economically, ‘the combination of 
weak state capacity, incompetent economics, and corruption paved the 
way for an authoritarian, if not autocratic, leader such as Viktor Orbán’.92
Emblematically, the ‘banned manoeuvres’ in certain of the EU’s 
‘new’ member states’ Europeanisation and convergence with the rest of 
the Union have also brought a new institutional discourse to the table − 
ie that of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which until 
now has not been very explicit in matters of the successes and failures of 
the CEECs’ European integration and member-statehood qualities. Both 
Poland and Hungary have challenged the authority of the EU top court 
and the primacy of EU law in select aspects of multilevel governance.93
As part of the country’s sweeping judiciary reforms, Poland estab-
lished in 2017 a special chamber charged to oversee judiciary discipline. 
Triggering the Article 7 TEU procedure, the EU Commission fi rst raised 
concerns, delivered a reasoned opinion, and then brought an action to 
the EU’s top court complaining about the disciplinary chamber’s inde-
pendence − not least as it is dominated by judges selected by Poland’s 
ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party. The Polish Supreme Court also ques-
tioned the legitimacy of such a body in its own ruling. On 8 April 2020, 
the CJEU ruled in Case C-791/19 Commission v Poland,94 ordering War-
7 TEU, even though the treaties do not explicitly refer to any ‘coloured’ procedures) is to be 
distinguished from the ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ procedures applicable within the EU 
law-making domain, under which the EU Member States’ national parliaments may object 
to a draft legislative act on grounds of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as 
set out in Art 7(2) and Art 7(3) of the Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality (the so-called ‘Early Warning System’ (EWS)). See eg Mi-
chael Zander, The Law-Making Process (7th edn, CUP 2015) 440-441.
90 On the EU’s legal framework for strengthening the rule of law (in Poland as well as EU-
wide), see Agnieszka Grzelak, ‘Ramy prawne UE na rzecz umacniania praworządności. Uwagi 
na tle wniosku Komisji Europejskiej z 20 grudnia 2017 r.’ (2018) 2 Sprawy Międzynarodowe 
213; Carlos Closa, ‘Institutional Logics and the EU’s Limited Sanctioning Capacity under 
Art 7 TEU’ (2020) International Political Science Review (OnlineFirst).
91 Zielonka (n 86) 7.
92 ibid.
93 Zosia Wanat and Lili Bayer, ‘EU Top Court’s Authority Challenged by Poland and Hun-
gary’ (POLITICO, 13 May 2020) <www.politico.eu/article/ecj-authority-challenged-by-po-
land-and-hungary> accessed 13 May 2020.
94 Case C-791/19 Commission v Poland, Order (on interim measures) of 8 April 2020, 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:277.
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saw to immediately suspend the functioning of a much-criticised judicial 
disciplinary chamber that may be used to undermine the independence 
of judges. The case resolution is still pending a fi nal judgment on Po-
land’s failure to fulfi l its obligations under EU law as a member state. 
As part of its larger ‘balancing on the edge’ strategy, Hungary has 
so far been avoiding direct confl ict with the CJEU. In 2011, for instance, 
when the CJEU ruled against Budapest for effectuating a legal change 
that led to removing close to 300 judges from their posts, Hungary re-
adjusted the retirement rules but never reinstated the change-affected 
judges to their previous (senior) positions. Similarly, in May 2020, it also 
backed down in its own clash with the CJEU over the (il)legality of plac-
ing asylum-seekers or third-country nationals in the Röszke transit zone 
at the Serbian-Hungarian border. Following the CJEU’s judgement of 14 
May 2020 in Joined Cases C-924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU,95 the Hun-
garian authorities let detained people out of the barbed-wire compounds 
(offi cially called ‘transit zones’) but denied that this was a move in fulfi l-
ment of the EU top court’s ruling. 
In the same vein, Hungary has so far been balancing on the edge of 
activation of the ‘Article 7’ procedure in front of the court.96 In September 
2018, just a year after the Commission triggered action against Poland, 
the ‘Article 7’ procedure was half-heartedly triggered against Hungary 
over similar concerns on judicial independence and creeping democratic 
backsliding in the country, not least as prime minister V Orbán and his 
ruling party (Fidesz) have lately been increasingly challenging European 
Union rules and values on the rule of law, an independent judiciary, me-
dia and academic freedom and other foundational values.
As such law-related overtures risk(ed) spreading the ‘authoritari-
an rot in Europe’,97 the European Parliament voted on 12 September 
2018 for action against Hungary, alleging breaches of the core values 
95 Joined Cases C-924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU FMS and Others v Országos Ide-
genrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság and Országos Ide-
genrendészeti Főigazgatóság ECLI:EU:C:2020:367.
96 Nanette Neuwahl and Charles Kovacs, ‘Hungary and the EU’s Rule of Law Protection’ 
(2020) Journal of European Integration (OnlineFirst) 11-12.
97 Kenneth Roth, ‘Stopping the Authoritarian Rot in Europe’ (EU Observer, 23 April 2020) 
<https://euobserver.com/opinion/148147> accessed 23 April 2020. R Daniel Kelemen 
contends that the EU has actually become trapped in an ‘authoritarian equilibrium’, owing 
to the trifecta of (1) the EU’s ‘half-baked’ party politics and ‘ingrained reluctance’ to interfere 
in domestic politics of its member states, (2) the EU’s contribution (funding, investment) 
to sustaining autocratic regimes among member states, and (3) the EU’s internal mar-
ket’s freedom of movement that ‘depletes the opposition and generates remittances, thereby 
helping these regimes endure’. See R Daniel Kelemen, ‘The European Union’s Authoritarian 
Equilibrium’ (2020) 27(3) Journal of European Public Policy 481.
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upon which the EU is founded.98 Until now, however, no action has been 
brought in front of the court. The issue was reopened in late March 2020 
when, faced with the spread of the coronavirus Covid-19 pandemic, the 
Hungarian Parliament granted the country’s prime minister V Orbán the 
ability to rule by decree for an indefi nite period. This development reacti-
vated the debates in the European Parliament and gave the Commission 
a new push to consider activating the ‘Article 7’ procedure. 
The scope of the problem is, however, much bigger and requires look-
ing beyond the ‘paradigmatic cases’ of Hungary and Poland, as Cianetti 
and others posit.99 The challenge of the proliferation of similar illiberal 
practices across EU member states has already urged EU institutions to 
think in terms of designing an EU permanent mechanism on democracy, 
rule of law and fundamental rights. Such legal creativity and mecha-
nism strengthening appears necessary also for the reason that Polish 
‘resistance’ to EU law supremacy and direct effect is not an episodic or 
the only case in point100 − enforcement of Europe’s foundational values in 
Central and Eastern Europe has both a mounting historical record and, 
most likely, will have a future, too.101 With the proven and rather rare 
exception of the Baltic states in their transition to full democracies,102 
the other CEECs recurrently face the dangers of backsliding to illiber-
al paths: corruption scandals and lagging judicial reforms in Bulgaria 
and Romania, as well as ad hoc illiberal alliances of the Visegrád Group 
(aka ‘V4’) (Hungary, Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia) that run at odds 
with Brussels’ liberal policies on migration and security, combined with 
repeated threats to judicial independence − all point to assessing these 
East-Central European states’ transition to liberal democracy as unfi n-
98 European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, ‘Report 
on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on 
European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values 
on which the Union is founded’ (2017/2131(INL)) 4 July 2018, Rapporteur: Judith Sargen-
tini (aka ‘Sargentini’ Report) <www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0250_
EN.html> accessed 18 May 2020.
99 Licia Cianetti, James Dawson and Seán Hanley, ‘Rethinking “Democratic Backsliding” 
in Central and Eastern Europe: Looking beyond Hungary and Poland’ (2018) 34(3) East 
European Politics 243.
100 Izabela Kraśnicka, ‘Reception of EU Law in Polish Courts: A Case of “Teddy Bear” Law’ 
in Elzbieta Kuzelewska and others (eds), European Judicial Systems as a Challenge for De-
mocracy (Intersentia 2015) 143-158.
101 Tine Carmeliet and Georgia Christina Kosmidou, ‘Enforcing Europe’s Foundational Val-
ues in Central and Eastern Europe: A Case in Point’ in Elzbieta Kuzelewska and others 
(eds), European Judicial Systems as a Challenge for Democracy (Intersentia 2015) 159−180.
102 Licia Cianetti, ‘Consolidated Technocratic and Ethnic Hollowness, But No Backsliding: 
Reassessing Europeanisation in Estonia and Latvia’ (2018) 34(3) East European Politics 
317-336.
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ished103 and unresilient.104 In the Covid-19 pandemic and post-pandemic 
realities, these trends might not only accelerate105 but also proliferate 
further across Central Europe, thus reversing the transformation trajec-
tories to where it all began by way of de-Europeanisation and de-democ-
ratisation more generally.
The fi rst signs of reverse transformation were recorded in the fi rst 
decade of the 21st century, just twenty years after the CEECs stepped 
the path of democratisation and were gradually returning to Europe. As 
early as 2007, the scholarly community started discussing the region in 
terms of democratic decline, especially when it came to party systems 
and a growing populist backlash106 − fi rst and foremost, in the ‘nucleus of 
Central Europe, the four so-called Visegrád countries’ that have become 
‘a real home for populism’.107 During the 2008 global crisis and the ensu-
ing 2008-2013 European fi nancial crisis, the decline of the East-Central 
European ‘defi cit democracies’ only accelerated, as argues Ágh,108 paving 
the way for a ‘growing gap between the formal democracy and substan-
tial democracy’ and thus rendering it ‘diffi cult to fi nd the proper term for 
these hybrid polities between democracy and non-democracy’. He further 
makes the case for treating reverse-transition developments in Hungary 
since the 2010 elections at least as a ‘worst-case scenario’ but cautions 
as well that trends in other ECE countries are also worrying, not least 
as democracy becomes hollowed out and the ‘de-Europeanisation’ and 
103 As an unfi nished project, the progress of democratic development in East-Central Eu-
rope is hardly immune to both domestic and external challenges and threats of sorts. See 
Jan Holzer and Miroslav Mareš (eds), Challenges to Democracies in East Central Europe 
(Routledge 2016).
104 In contrast to the partially problematic institutional and political fabrics of individual 
CEE counties’ transition, in economic, industrial-technological and environmental terms, 
the transition and resilience of East-Central European states and their regions have demon-
strated a better − even though, uneven − track record. See, eg, Adam Drobniak, Adam Polko 
and Jan SucháËek, ‘Transition and Resilience in Central and Eastern European Regions’ in 
Gábor Lux and Gyula Horváth (eds), The Routledge Handbook to Regional Development in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Routledge 2018) 240-260.
105 See eg Aleksandra Kustra-Rogatka, ‘Backgrounder: Poland’s Presidential Elections, 
Covid-19, and the Rule of Law Crisis’ (Democracy Reporting International, 4 May 2020) 
<https://democracy-reporting.org/de/dri_publications/backgrounder-polands-presiden-
tial-elections-covid-19-and-the-rule-of-law-crisis> accessed 4 May 2020.
106 Jacques Rupnik, ‘From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backlash’ (2007) 18(4) Journal 
of Democracy 17; Ivan Krastev, ‘Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? The Strange Death of 
the Liberal Consensus’ (2007) 18(4) Journal of Democracy 56.
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(Routledge 2019) 74-75.
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‘de-Democratisation’ trends deepen.109 For the EU’s political system and 
very existence as a liberal democratic supranational polity, such trends, 
if proliferated and exaggerated, may become detrimental to its ontologi-
cal security. 
The lagging behind, disruption and even reversal of the democrati-
sation and Europeanisation processes can also be observed within the 
EU’s neighbourhoods, including the ‘new’ Eastern European space.110
6 Love thy neighbour: ‘new’ Eastern Europe, the European Union 
and neighbour state-building
Following the general success of the 2004/07 eastward enlarge-
ment, the European Union embraced the logic of Europeanisation and 
EU member state-building also with regard to the Western Balkans can-
didate countries in South-East Europe, with Croatia having become the 
fi rst of the seven countries to join the EU in July 2013, and accession 
negotiations opened with Montenegro and Serbia while being half-green-
lit for Albania and North Macedonia; and remaining ‘potential candidate 
countries’ in the region, ie Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, being 
put on the waiting list. Importantly, the process of accession negotia-
tions opening with Albania and North Macedonia, initially due to start 
in autumn 2019, stalled and were postponed despite major reforms on 
their part after France, supported by a small group of EU member states, 
vetoed the move and submitted instead a non-paper on a new − enhanced 
− enlargement methodology, which puts particular emphasis on the rule 
of law and acquis conditionalities111 and seeks to drive a more partner-
ship-based engagement with candidate states before their accession to 
the European Union.112 Such a move evidently built on a crucial and sen-
sitive moment in European integration and the EU’s internal dynamics 
post-2010s.
Such political hesitance has also been supported publicly, as Euro-
pean citizens remain predominantly against further enlargement of the 
EU, as the 2014 polls showed: the idea is fi rmly supported by some 37% 
109 ibid.
110 Adam Szymański, ‘De-Europeanization and De-Democratization in the EU and Its 
Neighborhood’ (2017) 15(2) Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe (RIESW) 187.
111 On a more recent critique of a (quantitative) acquis alignment-based approach to the 
rule of law in its enlargement policy and the insuffi cient emphasis on the quality of the 
domestic change process as well as legality as a core element of the rule of law, see Lisa 
Louwerse, ‘Mind the Gap: Issues of Legality in the EU’s Conceptualisation of the Rule of 
Law in Its Enlargement Policy’ (2019) 15 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 27.
112 Spasimir Domaradzki, ‘A New Approach: The EU and the Western Balkans’ (Visegrad 
Insight, 12 February 2020) <https://visegradinsight.eu/a-new-approach-eu-western-bal-
kans> accessed 12 May 2020.
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of the population only, whereas 49% are against any near-future Europe-
an Union enlargement.113 Rather unsurprisingly, the inter-regional com-
parison between ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU member states shows that, within ‘new’ 
EU member states (ie relatively recent EU entrants themselves), there are 
no signifi cant differences in support for further enlargement, whereas the 
‘old’ member states show considerable variance on that matter.114
Back in 2003, EU citizens’ public support for further enlargement 
beyond the 2004/07 round had been far more enthusiastic than it is 
today. In contrast to today’s lasting mood of ‘enlargement fatigue’, some 
seventeen years, two enlargements (the CEECs in 2004/07 and Croatia 
in 2013) and one abridgement (2016-2020 ‘Brexit’) back, EU citizens were 
largely (54%) welcoming of the EU’s further enlargements, provided that, 
prior to any new enlargement, there was a Europewide agreement on the 
‘defi nitive borders of the European Union’.115 Signifi cantly, already back 
then, EU citizens were willing also to explore alternative ways of struc-
turing the EU’s relations with neighbours below the level of full-fl edged 
membership (69%).
In 2006, however, a striking majority of EU citizens (72%) expressed 
their agreement with further EU enlargement ‘provided the process 
doesn’t go too fast’.116 Nearly the same majority (70%) agreed that, in 
parallel to the ongoing enlargement process unfolding at an acceptable 
pace, the EU should offer other neighbouring countries a different type 
of relationship which falls short of full membership.117
Currently, as the EU enlargement process is undergoing a ‘face-lift-
ing’ reform following the 2019 French-driven detour, Brussels has been 
working out strategies for a structured and ‘enhanced EU engagement’ 
with the Western Balkans while maintaining a credible enlargement 
perspective.118 Akin to these efforts, the European Union has also been 
facing, since the early 2000s, manifold internal and external dilemmas 
of structuring its engagement with other ‘post-Soviet’ Eastern European 
and South Caucasian neighbours that have largely been lacking any 
credible accession perspective.
113 Standard Eurobarometer 81: ‘Public Opinion in the European Union’ (Spring 2014) 143-
144.
114 Gordana –uroviÊ, Miloš BigoviÊ and Nikola MiloviÊ, ‘Support for Further Enlargement 
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115 Flash Eurobarometer 140 (n 67) 77-78.
116 Special Eurobarometer 259: ‘The European Union and Its Neighbours’ (October 2006) 20.
117 ibid, 21.
118 Commission, ‘Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans’ (2020), <https://
ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/eu-and-western-balkans_en> accessed 
6 May 2020.
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The EU’s 2004/07 − Eastern − enlargement has not only shifted the 
EU’s new external border but it has also shifted the perception of ‘Europe’ 
and the ‘East’,119 thus amalgamating the space beyond the new border 
into a ‘New Eastern Europe’.  As more public and political discourses in 
the region move past the ‘post-Soviet’ sphere, the more visible it becomes 
that yet another dilemma of ‘two Europes’ is looming large − thirty years 
after the fi rst of its kind surfaced.
Even though post-Soviet and post-Socialist/Communist countries 
commenced their state-building and transformative agendas simultane-
ously early on in 1989/1990, the gap in where they fi nd themselves today 
is clearly seen. Some pundits even argue that, for instance, Ukraine is 
now where Poland was two decades ago. Whereas in Poland and other 
CEECs the priority tasks include enhancing European integration and 
their own further Europeanisation, in Ukraine, but also in other post-So-
viet countries, the key issues in state-building and transformation are 
still ‘de-Sovietisation, decolonisation, de-Russifi cation, de-oligarchisa-
tion’ and only then ‘democratisation and Europeanisation’.120 It should 
also be added that external factors played diametrically-opposite roles 
in the cases of the CEECs’ and post-Soviet countries’ transitions: whilst 
for East-Central Europe, the (credible perspective and actual process) 
of joining Western Euro-Atlantic institutions presented the necessary 
push and alignment model for democratic transitions, the New Eastern 
Europe’s (ie ‘Western’ New Independent States) democratic transforma-
tion and state-building have more generally been externally constrained 
inasmuch as the countries have been trapped between the enlarging EU 
and the postcolonial neo-imperial Russia, with no perspective in sight of 
joining the former nor any wish to rejoin the latter. Moreover, if, thirty 
years back, the battle of ideologies in post-Communist CEECs was swiftly 
won by the one-time knockdown of communism, the ideological struggle 
in New Eastern Europe has been continuing until now − between democ-
racy vs authoritarianism, liberalism vs illiberalism, not to mention the 
heavy and lasting legacy of many shades of ‘post-Sovietness’, including 
permeating corruption, state and media capture, oligarchy, and Russia’s 
undying interest in (re)claiming its ‘sphere of infl uence’. 
A series of revolutions across the countries of New Eastern Europe − 
including Ukraine’s three revolutions (the 1990 Granite Revolution, the 
2004 Orange Revolution, and the 2013/14 Euromaidan/Dignity Revolu-
119 Kaija E Schilde, ‘Who Are the Europeans? European Identity Outside of European Inte-
gration’ (2014) 52(3) Journal of Common Market Studies 650.
120 Hryhoriy Perepelytsia, ‘Urkaïna ta Polshcha: 25 rokiv postkomunistychnogo tranzytu 
(porivnialnyi analiz)’ [‘Ukraine and Poland: 25 Years of Post-Communist Transit (A Compar-
ative Analysis)’] (2018) 1 Sprawy Międzynarodowe 193.
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tion),121 Georgia’s two revolutions (the 2003 Rose Revolution and the 2018 
Rave Revolution), Armenia’s 2008 presidential election protests as well 
as the 2015 Revolution of socket (aka #ElectricYerevan, ElectroMaidan) 
and the 2018 Velvet Revolution, but also Moldova’s 2009 Twitter Revolu-
tion − possibly best exemplifi ed the popular determination to break with 
the vicious circle of post-Sovietness and re-boost the virtuous circle of 
transformation, including by forging closer ties with united Europe, up 
to acceding to the European Union, as, for instance, Ukraine, Georgia 
and Moldova have been aspiring to do for the past two decades.
Largely inspired by the success of its own enlargement as well, the 
European Union has engrained the enlargement methodology lite into its 
foreign-policy repertoire, which, in the immediate neighbourhood space, 
has been particularly (but falsely so?) reminiscent of accession condi-
tionality-driven transformative agendas. ‘Mesmerised by enlargement’, 
the EU’s new Eastern policy post-2004 was essentially designed with EU 
interest in mind − to capitalise on enlargement and concurrently capitu-
late on accession-related political and economic commitments vis-à-vis 
new Eastern neighbours.122 Consequently, the rationality of building EU- 
and European integration-compatible neighbours substantially under-
pinned the European Union’s effort in structuring its engagement with 
the neighbours (especially in the framework of the association of the 
three Eastern Partnership countries), thereby also complementing the 
neighbours’ own state-building and pro-European development agendas. 
Signifi cantly, both liberal-democratic and market access-acquis condi-
tionality have been, to varying degrees of success, guiding the dynamics 
of bilateral relations with the EU’s Eastern European and South Cauca-
sian neighbours.
This is quite symbolic as well, given that such a political framework 
sometimes creates misleading analogies of a ‘wider Europe’-in-the-mak-
ing by way of enlargement, whereas the latter might not be on offer any 
time soon, if at all. The cross-border spill-overs and regional integration 
projects along the EU’s eastern borderlands even further contribute to 
the blurring of a new-age ‘paper curtain’ and the divide between ‘new’ 
and ‘newer’ Eastern Europe.123 
121 ‘The Three Revolutions Project (3R)’, College of Europe in Natolin, available at <ww-
w.3rnatolin.eu> accessed 20 July 2020.
122 Simon Lightfoot, Balázs Szent-Iványi, and Kataryna Wolczuk, ‘Mesmerized by Enlarge-
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Quite fi guratively, in no other policy area but in its infrastructure 
and connectivity does the connection between the EU’s CEECs ‘new’ 
member states and its new Eastern Partners become so visible, palpable 
and instrumental to wider European region-building. It is also symbol-
ic that regional development, transport and tourism matters are occa-
sionally discussed jointly for the entire extended East-Central European 
space from Czechia to Georgia: for instance, the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Regional Development suggested, in its Opinion on im-
proving the connection and accessibility of the transport infrastructure 
in Central and Eastern Europe, that, for the sake of the EU and its bor-
derlands’ cohesion, the Commission would need to consider both boost-
ing the development of North-South transport corridors (such as the Via 
Carpathia route), extend its TEN-T transport networks to Western Bal-
kan candidate countries and Eastern Partners as well, ‘for the benefi t of 
Central and Eastern Europe as a whole’.124
Since the adoption the European Commission’s ‘Wider Europe − 
Neighbourhood’ Communication,125 the relations between the Europe-
an Union and its new Eastern neighbours have been generally built 
around a broader multilateral framework of the 2004-launched Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), with a regional − Eastern Europe-
an − focus instated in 2009 when, upon a Polish-Swedish proposal, the 
Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative was set in motion.126 Both policy 
frameworks have been subject to much criticism and exposure in public 
debate, with the ENP having undergone two revisions and the EaP’s re-
vision unfolding in late 2020. Some fi fteen years back, however, in 2006, 
only about one-fi fth of the EU population was actually aware of the Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the great majority (82%) were 
largely unfamiliar with such an EU policy framework for structuring 
its relations with the immediate neighbours.127 The main (purposeful?) 
mystery has been, among other things, the question of the perspective of 
EU accession that was neither explicitly granted nor explicitly precluded 
124 European Parliament Committee on Regional Development (EP REGI), ‘Opinion of the 
Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on Transport and Tourism on im-
proving the connection and accessibility of the transport infrastructure in Central and 
Eastern Europe’ (2015/2347(INI)) Brussels (21 April 2016) 4 <www.europarl.europa.eu/
doceo/document/A-8-2016-0282_EN.html> accessed 20 July 2020.
125 Commission, ‘Wider Europe − Neighbourhood: Proposed New Framework for Relations 
with the EU’s Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ (IP/03/358) 18 March 2003 <https://
ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_03_358> accessed 16 September 
2019.
126 For a comprehensive overview of the ENP and EaP policy frameworks development, see, 
eg, Tobias Schumacher, Andreas Marchetti and Thomas Demmelhuber (eds), The Routledge 
Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy (Routledge 2018).
127 Special Eurobarometer 259 (n 116) 19.
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by these policy frameworks, which, particularly in the context of some 
Eastern European neighbour states’ aspirations, has been increasing-
ly seen as problematic, leaving them levitate ‘between membership and 
non-membership’.128 
In light of the accelerating democratic-revolutionary transforma-
tions in select Eastern European neighbours, the EU extended the offer 
of political association and economic integration, via enhanced Associ-
ation Agreements with the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
Component (AA/DCFTA), to Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova as well as Arme-
nia and Azerbaijan. The latter two fell out of the association process as 
Azerbaijan pushed for its own contractual framework with the EU, and 
Armenia had to thoroughly rethink its association with the EU against 
the tabled resolute Russian ‘offer one cannot refuse’ and thus, pressed 
by the Kremlin and impressed by the domestic and international distur-
bance in Ukraine following its revolutionary move to defend the country’s 
‘European choice’, Yerevan acceded to the Russia-led Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU). Still, in 2016, Armenia used the window of opportuni-
ty and signed with the EU the Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement (CEPA), which in many regards draws on the economic parts 
of the declined AA/DCFTA deal. In turn, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine 
signed with the European Union their AA/DCFTAs in 2014 and walked 
the priority lane of European integration via association.129 
Just like the EU’s initial Association Agreements with the CEECs 
(‘Europe Agreements’), the new-generation Association Agreements with 
the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Component (AA/DCFTA) 
it concluded with the EaP3 do not explicitly envisage an accession per-
spective − and, traditionally, do not explicitly preclude it either. The déjà 
vu also accompanies the very content and scope of the new-generation 
AAs, which are heavily integration-oriented association frameworks, and 
thus ipso facto extend the European Union’s member state-building tem-
plates and agendas beyond the current membership and, importantly, 
beyond the enlargement rationale as such. This leads one to argue to the 
contrary: by mimicking its member state-building process onto its (East-
ern) neighbours without envisioning at the same time any transition to 
member-statehood as such (ie by pursuing the EU-incentivised ‘transfor-
mation qua Europeanisation’ beyond the realm of current and potential 
candidate countries), the European Union is set to extend the EUropean 
identity and rationalities of both governance and integrated statehood 
on what is deemed (or, doomed) to become lastingly an aligned, differ-
entiatingly integrated, and institutionally-embedded (but formally not 
128 Tyushka (n 27).
129 Tyushka (n 41).
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represented therein) neighbourhood. In other words, by Europeanising 
the neighbourhood via enhanced association, the European Union un-
avoidably shapes the countries’ own state-building agendas, and thus is 
structurally and consistently engaged in neighbour state-building, that 
is, steering the new Eastern European neighbours’ transformation in a 
particular EU-centric direction, with the illusory and distant reality of 
them becoming ‘would-be members’, deceivingly substituting the carrot of 
accession conditionality as we know it. As long as the EU’s and EaP3 as-
sociates’ own agendas in their state-building and strategic development 
coincide, the process of democratic transformation and Europeanisa-
tion is bound to continue − even in spite of the disillusioning possibility 
of Georgia, Moldova and/or Ukraine getting stuck as ‘eternal’ would-be 
members (effectively, ‘non-members’). In light of the proliferating tempo-
ral, geographical and political differentiation in European integration 
within and beyond the EU, ‘non-member’ status may potentially offer 
more incentive, inclusivity and future − should the EU’s institutional dis-
course and constitutional and political differentiation shift from ‘binary’ 
to ‘graded’ membership in the not too distant future.130 In any case, the 
‘non-member’ and ‘neighbour-state’ statuses with the EU are already an 
expression of a privileged, relatively inclusive, enhanced, and structured 
relationship of mutual engagement which considerably contrasts with 
the regular ‘third country’ positioning vis-à-vis the European Union. 
In her genuinely comparative and transformation-focused book Rus-
sia, the Former Soviet Republics, and Europe since 1989: Transformation 
and Tragedy, Graney131 places the strength of Europeanisation projects 
in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine already now very close to that of the 
now-EU and NATO member states (and formerly, too, Soviet republics) of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, whereas classifying Armenian and Azer-
baijani Europeanisation projects as rather moderately strong, leaving 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Central Asian republics further be-
hind. Whereas Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus appear unambiguously 
European in the geographical sense, only the former two embraced the 
Europeanisation possibilities broadly enough, with Belarus dragging be-
hind on the way towards limited economic Europeanisation and showing 
close to no interest in political transformation.132 On the other hand, 
the South Caucasian states have long been geographically considered 
as the endpoint of Europe; however, their lasting ties with the European 
130 Schimmelfennig and Winzen (n 74) 156-175; Tyushka (n 27).
131 Graney (n 64) 10-11.
132 ibid, 210-263. The most recent mass protests in Belarus, which ensued after the trou-
blesome August 2020 presidential elections, demonstrate a surprising break with the de-
cades-long path dependency and might become a turning point in the country’s democratic 
transition.
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Union and more recent joint economic and political undertakings point 
to the emergence of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan as Europe’s ‘new 
eastern boundary’.133 This is particularly so since one of them − Geor-
gia − has since 2014 been an EU associate country just like Moldova 
and Ukraine, who all signed with the European Union far-reaching As-
sociation Agreements with Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Com-
ponents (AA/DCFTAs) and have long been expressing their European 
integration aspirations. Armenia, too, was moving along that path until 
Russia made it do a U-turn and reset the country’s foreign-political and 
domestic-developmental compass north-eastwards − aligning with the 
Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union.
Domestic offi cial discourses in EaP3-associated states richly fea-
ture the frames of the countries’ European identities: ‘Georgia is Europe!’ 
and ‘Ukraine is Europe!’ have not only become ornaments of pathetic 
political speeches − they have also shaped in the last two decades peo-
ples’ own understandings of belonginess and the future. In addition to 
claiming their ‘return to Europe’, akin to that of the CEECs in the mid-
1990s, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have, too, been telling their stories 
of Europe and Europeanness134 − even if the offi cial Brussels has not yet 
been willing to acknowledge the possibility of such a ‘return’ by granting 
the prospect of EU accession.135 Paradoxically, the closer the ties the new 
Eastern European associates forge with EUrope, the more distant their 
membership perspective appears − the Union that they started legally 
and politically approximating with half a decade ago is fading away, giv-
ing way to emerging new Europes of sorts. For Ukraine, whose choice for 
Europe has been excruciatingly tested time and again, this paradox is 
hard to face. As deftly observed by Getmanchuk,136 ‘[i]f earlier [Ukraine] 
tried to jump into the last car of a train moving towards a bright Eu-
ropean dream, now more and more often a feeling begets that we are 
trying to catch at least the footplate of the Euro-Express, which is racing 
at breakneck speed in an unknown direction’. This notwithstanding, 
133 ibid, 264-316.
134 Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk, Celebrating Borderlands in a Wider Europe: 
Nations and Identities in Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia (Nomos Verlag 2016) 125.
135 As the recent turns in EU enlargement to the Western Balkans showcase, the European 
Union’s lasting ‘enlargement fatigue’ has gradually transformed into ‘enlargement resis-
tance’, which adds the EU’s internal problems and disintegration challenges to the ‘Copen-
hagen criteria’ and ‘absorption capacity’ doorstoppers. See, eg, Spyros Economides, ‘From 
Fatigue to Resistance: EU Enlargement and the Western Balkans’ (20 March 2020) 17 
Dahrendorf Forum IV − Working Paper 1.
136 Aliona Getmanchuk, ‘Peredmova: Ostanni Romantyky Evropy’ [‘Preface: The Last Ro-
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Ukrainians can be named ‘the last romantics of Europe’137 − and rightly 
so as they were fi rst in the 21st century to stand, fi ght and die for Euro-
pean values. The 2013/14 Revolution of Dignity and the following defen-
sive war against Russian hybrid aggression are inextricably linked with 
Ukraine’s European choice. 
The political symbolism of a ‘European choice’ and ‘Europeanness’ 
proliferates across all three EaP associates, as it does, to a lesser extent, 
in other reform-oriented ‘post-Soviet’ states, whose transformative and 
state-building agendas, just as popular discourses, have been time and 
again driven by the idea of a ‘Evroremont’ (literally: ‘Eurorepair’),138 ie 
transition to a European-style democracy.139 Understandably, in some 
policy and political contexts, however, the ‘Evroremont’ framing and pol-
itics prove just to have been deft masking of pertinent post-Soviet prac-
tices.
But even being half-heartedly Europeanised, as many authors would 
argue, the EU’s EaP3 associates are becoming increasingly embedded in 
the European Union policy-shaping milieus − all in the spirit of the prom-
ised (by the Association Agreements) ‘stakes’ in the EU internal market 
and ‘system’.140 The core EU institutions are closed for any third-coun-
try participation but, for the past couple of years, EU-EaP Ministeri-
als, including foreign affairs ministers and the EU’s HR/VP, have been 
launched. EaP3 associates’ ministers are also occasionally invited as 
observers to the Council’s meetings. More recently, in May 2020, follow-
ing the breakout of the COVID-19 pandemic, Ukraine was invited to join 
the EU’s Health Security Committee as an observer in pursuit of closer 
cooperation in fi ghting this novel coronavirus.141
In addition to these sporadic and largely informal institutional en-
gagement modalities, the EU’s neighbour-states, including all the EaP6, 
have been incrementally involved in the operations of EU agencies. In 
2007 to 2017 alone, the Eastern partners structured their relations with 
137 ibid, 12.
138 In the popular culture of select post-Soviet societies, ‘Evroremont’ also signifi es what it 
quite literally means − ‘Eurorepair’, ie home or apartment renovation that uses more expen-
sive modern materials, technology and (un-Soviet) styles.
139 Oleksandra Seliverstova, ‘Keeping Alive the “Imaginary West” in post-Soviet Countries’ 
(2017) 25(1) Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 117.
140 Tyushka (n 41) 92-105.
141 Other non-EU states that are part of the EU’s Health Security Committee as ‘observers’ 
are the EU-associated via the SAA Serbia, the member of the EU Customs Union and EU 
candidate country Turkey, and the three EEA states − Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Nor-
way. See European Commission − Health Security Committee members, n.d., available at 
<https://ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness_response/risk_management/hsc/members_
en> accessed 18 August 2020.
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EU agencies as follows: EASA (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova in 2009; 
Armenia in 2011; and Ukraine in 2015); Frontex (Ukraine in 2007; Geor-
gia and Moldova in 2008; Belarus in 2009; Armenia and Azerbaijan in 
2012 and 2013, respectively); CEPOL (Georgia − 2011; Moldova − 2012; 
Armenia − 2016); Europol (Moldova in 2014; Georgia and Ukraine in 
2016); Eurojust (Moldova − 2014; Ukraine - 2016); EMCDDA (Ukraine 
− 2010; Moldova - 2012), etc.142 As the only non-EU (ENP/EaP) coun-
try, Ukraine has also been cooperating, since 2016, with the European 
Defence Agency (EDA). Furthermore, the EaP6’s varied participation in 
the EU’s CSDP missions as well as generally high (as far as the EaP3 
associates are regarded) alignment with the EU’s CFSP declarations for 
over a decade now are irrefutable signs of increasing cooperation and a 
‘technocratic form of integration into the EU, a sort of de facto technocrat-
ic membership’.143 
Incrementally, the European Union, too, engages externally in mat-
ters that have originally belonged to internal policy areas, such as asy-
lum, migration, culture and social policies, employment, environment, 
energy, gender, sports or health.144 Through structuring its engagement 
with Eastern neighbours also in these policy domains, the scope of EU 
neighbour state-building extends to new breadths and further dissoci-
ates neighbour-statehood from ordinary third-country nation-statehood.
On the trade-transactional and economic convergence side, the sit-
uation varies from country to country, but the trend of the European 
Union becoming their trade partner number one is fi rmly set in mo-
tion, whereas some of the associates, namely Ukraine, are already in 
the process of negotiating the so-called ‘industrial visa-free regime’ (ie 
a freer circulation of certifi ed industrial goods among Ukraine and the 
EU member states). The pace of European integration-driven domestic 
reforms is not unproblematic but has a record of a series of political, 
legal and constitutional transformations.145 Last but not least, the per-
formance of the joint bodies set up under Association Agreement frame-
works just half a decade ago shows a strong record of decision-making 
which is conducive to further dynamisation of the EU-EaP3 associates’ 
142 Karina Shyrokykh and Dovilè Rimkutè, ‘EU Rules Beyond Its Borders: The Policy-spe-
cifi c Effects of Transgovernmental Networks and EU Agencies in the European Neighbour-
hood’ (2019) 57(4) Journal of Common Market Studies 749.
143 ibid, 750.
144 Simon Schunz and Chad Damro, ‘Expanding Actorness to Explain EU External Engage-
ment in Originally Internal Policy Areas’ (2020) 27(1) Journal of European Public Policy 122.
145 For a recent comprehensive overview of EU-Ukrainian, EU-Moldovan and EU-Geor-
gian AA/DCFTA implementation and the dynamics of domestic reforms, see Anna Zy-
gierewicz (ed), Association Agreements between the EU and Moldova, Georgia and 
Ukraine (European Parliamentary Research Service 2018).
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structured engagement and both the Union’s and associate states’ own 
legal-systemic change.146 
All in all, the patterns of the EU-neighbourhood relations and the 
EU neighbourhood’s Europeanisation point to the formation of a Europe-
an centre of gravity for both the nation-state and neighbour state-build-
ing agendas of the EU’s three Eastern associates, and, to a lesser extent, 
the remaining three Eastern partners. Not only is their transformation 
trajectory reminiscent of that of the mid-1990s’ CEE EU associates − the 
‘new Eastern Europe’s transition to EU ‘neighbour statehood’ is guided 
by the similarly tantalising ‘would-be’ membership rationality.
7 Conclusions: EU member and neighbour state-building in a wider 
Europe decades ago and decades to go 
The process of democratic transformation and transition from 
‘post-Soviet/Socialist’ states to EU member states commenced quite alee 
as it was unfolding in the generally favourable conditions of the exter-
nal opportunities structure in a post-bipolar and post-Cold War Europe 
as well as in the presented external incentives of European integration. 
After the CEECs’ accession to the European Union had completed their 
longed-for ‘return to Europe’, their democratic transition and condition-
ality-induced Europeanisation started sporadically showing signs of 
unsustainability, thus dragging aweather the process and progress of 
building up their EU member-statehood. 
Liberal democracy and the market economy are obviously part and 
parcel of EU member-statehood, but not just them: a whole set of nor-
mative conventions and political practices, strategic interaction and pol-
icy-making rules make the EU’s liberal-democratic and market-econom-
ic foundation genuinely distinct. After all, there are liberal democracies 
and market economies beyond the EU, but not all of them are ‘EU-fi t’ by 
default. Making the aspiring candidate countries ‘EU-fi t’ while incen-
tivising their transformation is an inseparable part of the EU member 
state-building agenda which, over the years, has also spilled over beyond 
enlargement politics and is practised within the European Union’s neigh-
bourhood policies alike. What EU member and neighbour state-building 
have clearly in common are two pillars of support for simultaneously 
occurring transformation, state-building and modernisation processes 
− ie the EU-induced and EU-centric market-economic transition (via eco-
146 Andriy Tyushka, ‘Beyond Institutional Design and Executive Implementation: Power and 
Performance of “Association Bodies” under the EU’s Association Agreements with Georgia, 
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nomic integration) and the political regime transformation (via democra-
tisation and Europeanisation).
With an eye on several illustrative cases, this article has looked into 
how, during three decades of transformation, the tables were turned, 
and the forerunners of democratic transition became one of the main 
resistants to European integration and liberal democratisation at large, 
whereas the laggards and ‘last-wagon-jumpers’ succeeded in catching 
up with the rest of the CEE region and accomplish a more resilient dem-
ocratic transition. The article has shown how Poland and Hungary, the 
leading forces of the post-1989 democratisation movement in East-Cen-
tral Europe, big Euroenthusiasts and ‘model candidates’ for EU acces-
sion, took a detour some ten years after joining the EU and (temporarily 
− one would wish to think) paused the construction of their EU mem-
ber-statehood, thus wholeheartedly re-embracing sovereignism. On the 
other hand, the above analysis has also demonstrated that the Baltic 
states that joined the eastward enlargement cohort of CEECs somewhat 
later, overall receiving lesser EU-institutional and public support and at-
tention, succeeded nonetheless in making their liberal-democratic tran-
sition resilient and became ‘exemplar’ European Union member states 
at least as far as their compliance with the Union’s fundamental norms, 
values and principles is concerned. A comparative look into these cases 
only reaffi rms what has always been intuitively assumed: democratic 
transformation is not always a straightforward, linear and programmat-
ic path − nor is it always bound to succeed and endure. 
In general, though, twenty years after the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’ 
and revolutions in East-Central Europe, the citizenry of the enlarged 
European Union believed that these landmark events brought more free-
dom to all parts of Europe (79%), provided good business opportunities 
for Western enterprises in the CEE region (80%), and, most signifi cantly, 
contributed to the free movement of people within Europe (86%).147 Em-
blematically, the majority of European citizens held the view that such 
changes were important not only for the CEECs but for the whole of 
Europe. Commemorating the historic twentieth anniversary of the fall 
of the Iron Curtain and the fi fth anniversary of the CEECs’ EU mem-
bership, EU Enlargement Commissioner O Rehn recalled civil society’s 
crucial contribution as a driver of democratisation in Europe and the 
EU’s ability to recover from crises by ‘failing forward’ to even greater 
integration and a ‘wider Europe’, effectively, not least in view of the per-
tinent raison d’être of EU enlargement: ‘to extend the area of liberty and 
democracy, peace and prosperity throughout Europe’.148 
147 Flash Eurobarometer 257 (n 72) 5.
148 Olli Rehn, ‘The EU and the Western Balkans: The Critical Year of 2009’, Speech by EU 
Commissioner for Enlargement Rehn (08/441), Brussels, 18 September 2008, <https://
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What had started as a lamentable crisis of non-compliance with 
EU values and the fundamental vision of good governance and democ-
racy in select member states, might equally present a ‘perfect storm’ for 
‘failing forward’ and taking EU member state-building to the next level. 
As both democratic transition and EU member state-building processes 
are lasting phenomena that do not (or should not, at least) stop at the 
moment of accession to the European Union, they require sustainable 
effort in monitoring compliance among EU member states with regard to 
what constitutes core parameters and shared idea(l)s of European Union 
member-statehood and EUropean identity at large. The 2020-launched 
European Rule of Law Mechanism, with the Annual Rule of Law Report 
at its heart,149 is certainly a move towards consolidating the rule of law 
culture in the EU and in post-accession member state-building policy at 
large.150 
The idea of ‘failing forward’ strongly resonates also in the contempo-
rary context of the multiplying crises both within the European Union, 
in its surrounding regional realms and globally, where the ambit of the 
EU’s external engagement broadens and thus necessitates like-minded 
and like-governed partners to tackle crises and succeed jointly. Building 
a neighbourhood akin to would-be EU members’ parameters represents 
both an ontological necessity and a convenient instrumental skill: after 
all, what the European Union has proven to be good at is transform-
ing states by Europeanising them. In much of the EU’s own discourse 
and European studies scholarship in general, ‘Europeanisation’ equals 
‘democratisation’, and vice versa − and, thus, both processes are close-
ly intertwined, embedded and partially overlapping in their core ideas, 
although representing distinct (distinguishable) phenomena. The con-
founding of EU-induced democratisation processes in New Eastern Eu-
rope and the Eastern neighbours’ own European integration-oriented 
state-building and strategic development agendas represent a remark-
ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_08_441> accessed 20 July 
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able blend of tantalising and enlargement-inspired transition from na-
tion-statehood to neighbour-statehood − even without a credible acces-
sion perspective. Growing opportunities for mutual structured engage-
ment as well as the associate neighbours’ ‘stake’ in the EU system and 
internal market so far provide for a suffi ciently incentivising condition-
ality. In order to make such a transformation reverse transition-proof, a 
formal shift from binary to gradual membership is inevitable − at least to 
account for the proliferating practice of within-EU and wider EUropean 
differentiated integration, as well as to foster the resilient democratic 
transition and interconnectedness of its new Eastern European neigh-
bours.
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